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The demand for air quality depends on health impacts and defensive investments, but little 
research assesses the empirical importance of defenses. A rich quasi-experiment suggests that the 
Nitrogen Oxides (NOx) Budget Program (NBP), a cap-and-trade market, decreased NOx 
emissions, ambient ozone concentrations, pharmaceutical expenditures, and mortality rates. The 
annual reductions in pharmaceutical purchases, a key defensive investment, and mortality are 
valued at about $800 million and $1.1 billion, respectively, suggesting that defenses are over 
one-third of willingness-to-pay for reductions in NOx emissions. Further, estimates indicate that 
the NBP’s benefits easily exceed its costs and that NOx reductions have substantial benefits. 
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Willingness to pay (WTP) for wellbeing frequently depends on factors that enter the utility 
function directly (e.g., the probability of mortality, school quality, local crime rates, etc.) and 
compensatory investments that help to determine these factors (Grossman 1972). In a wide 
variety of contexts, the empirical literature has almost exclusively focused on the direct effects 
(e.g., health outcomes) of these factors and left the defensive investments largely unmeasured. 
As examples, there has been little effort to measure: the use of medications or air filters to 
protect against poor air quality (e.g., Chay and Greenstone 2003; Currie and Neidell 2005); 
parental expenditures on supplemental tutoring to improve educational outcomes for their 
children; or the costs of alarm systems and additional security to protect against crime. All of 
these defensive investments are costly and displace consumption of utility-generating goods. 
Indeed, economic theory suggests that these actions constitute a significant portion of the costs 
of harms, as individuals should set the marginal utility of their purchase equal to the marginal 
utility of avoiding the harm itself. It therefore seems reasonable to presume that the available 
estimates of willingness to pay for a wide variety of factors are substantially understated. 
 This paper develops a measure of willingness to pay for air quality improvements that 
accounts for both the direct health impacts and defensive investments. As a measure of defensive 
behavior, we investigate whether medication usage responds to changes in air quality. This is 
likely to be an especially important measure of defensive expenditures, because, for example, the 
annual cost of prescription medications for asthma is reported to exceed the monetized value of 
any other component of asthma’s social cost, including mortality, emergency department 
admissions, or lost productivity (Weiss and Sullivan 2001). We also provide new evidence on 
how air pollution affects more commonly studied outcomes like mortality and hospitalizations. 
 The empirical application is based on a quasi-experiment that exploits three sources of 
variation in the introduction of an emissions market for nitrogen oxides (NOx). The NOx Budget 
Trading Program (NBP) operated a cap-and-trade system for over 2,500 electricity generating 




this market had the goal of decreasing ozone pollution, which reaches high levels in summer, the 
market operated only between May 1 and September 30. Specifically, we use a triple-difference 
estimator that compares pollution, defensive expenditures and health outcomes in the NBP 
participating and non-participating states, before versus after 2003, and summer versus winter.2 
 The empirical analysis produces several key results. First, there was a substantial decline 
in air pollution emissions and ambient concentrations. Figure 1 illustrates the dramatic effect of 
this market on NOx emissions in the states participating in the NBP.
3 In 2001-2002, daily NOx 
emissions were fairly flat throughout the calendar year, with a peak in summer. In 2005-2007, 
NOx emissions were nearly 40% lower but almost entirely during the summer months when the 
NBP was in force. NOx emissions are a primary ingredient in the complex function that produces 
ozone air pollution, so it is unsurprising that we find that the large reductions in NOx led to 
declines in mean ozone concentrations of roughly 6% and reduced the number of summer days 
with high ozone levels (i.e., more than 65 ppb) by about 35%, or a third of a standard deviation.  
Second, these improvements in air quality produced substantial benefits. Medication 
expenditures decreased by about 1.5% or roughly $800 million annually in the 19 Eastern and 
Midwestern United States where the NBP was in force; this is close to an upper bound estimate 
of the NBP’s total abatement costs. This decline in medication expenditures is evident both 
among short-acting respiratory medications taken in response to the presentation of respiratory 
symptoms and long-term control medications that are taken to prevent these episodes. Since 
people can engage in other defensive investments like avoiding time outdoors or purchasing air 
filters, medication expenditures provide a lower bound on the total defensive costs associated 
with air pollution. Further, the summertime mortality rate declined by up to 0.5%, corresponding 
to 2,200 fewer premature deaths per summer in the NBP states, mainly among individuals 75 and 
older. The application of age-adjusted estimates of the value of a statistical life (Murphy and 
Topel 2006) implies this reduced mortality is valued at about $1,100 million annually. The 
                                                 
2 “Winter” in this paper refers to the combined months of January-April and October-December.  
3 Unless otherwise noted, our data on NOx emissions refer to emissions from power plants covered by our data (i.e., 




mortality estimates are less precise than the medication ones, and the results must be interpreted 
accordingly. Additionally, there is little systematic evidence of an effect of the NBP on 
hospitalization charges. Overall, it is striking that defensive investments account for more than 
one-third of our estimate of total willingness-to-pay for reductions in NOx emissions.
4 
Third, the paper provides the first instrumental variables estimates of the effect of NOx 
emissions on health and defensive investments. Such information is an essential determinant of 
air quality policy since NOx is a pollutant that can be controlled directly by regulation, whereas 
ozone cannot be. Ambient ozone is determined by a complex function based on several factors 
including NOx emissions, volatile organic compound emissions, and temperature. These 
estimates suggest a significant causal link between NOx emissions, medication purchases, and 
mortality. For example, we find that a 10 percentage point (pp) reduction in NOx emissions leads 
to 0.06 pp reduction in medication purchases and also a 0.07 pp reduction in mortality. Further, it 
may be appropriate to conclude the reductions in ozone concentrations stemming from the 
reductions in NOx emissions are the primary channel for these health improvements; we 
cautiously report instrumental variable estimates that reveal positive relationships between 
ambient ozone concentrations and medication expenditures and mortality rates, respectively. 
In addition to providing new evidence on the empirical importance of defensive 
expenditures in the context of air pollution, this paper makes several contributions.5 First, the 
results may be useful for the ongoing and contentious academic and policy debates about the 
regulation of NOx emissions as a means to reduce ambient ozone concentrations. The recent 
                                                 
4 NOx emissions can influence crop yields (through ozone), visibility, the value of outdoor activities, the purchase of 
air filters, and other factors. A complete measure of willingness to pay for reductions in NOx emissions, as well as 
the defensive expenditures’ (e.g., air filter purchases) share, would include all of these factors. 
5 An emerging empirical literature aims to measure behavioral responses, including defenses, to health-reducing 
environmental factors (Graff-Zivin and Neidell 2009; Neidell 2009; Deschênes and Greenstone 2011; Graff-Zivin, 
Neidell, and Schlenker 2011; Barreca et al. 2016; Ito and Zhang 2016). An older theoretical literature analyzes 
defenses and willingness to pay (Courant and Porter 1981; Bartik 1988). A small epidemiological literature, largely 
using samples of under 100 asthma patients, shows that asthmatics increase medication use on polluted days 
(Menichini and Mudu 2010). As we discuss later, our focus on summer versus rest-of-year seasonal expenditures 
improves over existing work, which focuses on same-day effects. Same-day regressions can suffer from short-term 
displacement if pollution merely shifts the day on which a person uses medication but does not change total 




controversy surrounding Volkswagen’s use of a “defeat device” that understated NOx emissions 
and ongoing litigation about the health consequences reflects the dearth of reliable information 
on the health consequences of NOx emissions. More broadly, ozone is one of the six “criteria” 
pollutants that the Clean Air Act targets, but unlike the other pollutants it has remained 
persistently high. Further, the Obama Administration tightened the national ambient air quality 
standard in 2015 from 75 to 70 ppb, following a long political and legal battle between the White 
House, EPA, Congress, and industry; as of 2015, 126 million Americans or about 40% of the 
population live in areas that violate this new air quality standard for ozone. These ozone 
standards are contentious at least partly because much of the previous evidence comes from 
observational studies where there is a substantial risk of confounding air pollution and other 
determinants of health.6 The central role of NOx emissions in controlling ozone concentrations is 
underscored by the fact that the regulatory impact analysis for the new ozone standard requires a 
65% reduction in NOx emissions between 2011 and 2025 (USEPA 2015). The paper speaks 
directly to this debate and can contribute to the regular updating of cost-benefit analyses of the 
Clean Air Act.7  
Second, this study is an important step forward in moving closer to the ideal of credibly 
measuring the consequences of sustained exposure to air pollution. Much of the literature 
relating human health and ozone concentrations focuses on daily or weekly variation in ozone 
and on specific states or groups of cities; studies based on daily and/or weekly variation are 
especially subject to concerns about “harvesting” or temporal displacement of mortality (and 
medication expenditures) and that the true loss of life expectancy is small (Deschenes and 
                                                 
6 Key papers about the relationship between health and ozone include Bell et al. (2004), Currie and Neidell (2005), 
NRC (2008), Jerrett et al. (2009), Neidell (2009), Lleras-Muney (2010), Moretti and Neidell (2011), and Dominici 
et. al (2014). 
7 The results are also important because they fill a knowledge gap in recent research on the NBP regulation. 
Economic research has found that the NBP led firms to install costly abatement technologies, and that regulated 
electricity generating units were especially likely to install highly effective “Selective Catalytic Reduction” 
abatement technology (Fowlie 2010). Engineering estimates suggest that the marginal abatement cost of NOx 
through this program is much larger than the marginal abatement cost of NOx from vehicles (Fowlie, Knittel, and 
Wolfram 2012). An integrated assessment model simulating costs and benefits of this market finds that the NBP as 
actually implemented was more cost-effective than an alternative design which recognized that damages vary across 




Greenstone 2011). In contrast, the NBP provides quasi-experimental variation in emitted and 
ambient air pollution at the 5-month level (i.e., May 1st through September 30th); in the case of 
ozone, this is effectively annual variation because ozone is only considered a health risk during 
the higher concentration summer months. For these reasons, the paper is less subject to concerns 
about harvesting and is well suited to shed light on efforts to control NOx emissions and ozone 
concentrations. Additionally, recent research has emphasized the importance of using quasi-
experimental variation to obtain reliable estimates of the relationship between human wellbeing 
and air pollution, and the NBP provides variation that is plausibly unrelated to other 
determinants of wellbeing (Dominici, Greenstone, and Sunstein 2014).  
Third, we are unaware of other studies that demonstrate the impact of an emissions 
market on ambient pollution and human health with real world data. Most evaluations of 
emissions markets combine engineering models of emissions abatement, chemistry models of 
pollution transport, and epidemiological dose-response models (e.g., Muller and Mendelsohn 
2009). The limitations of this approach are underlined by our failure to find consistent evidence 
of an impact of the NBP market on particulates air pollution, which the models (and the EPA) 
projected as the primary channel for any health benefits. In contrast, this paper’s analysis is 
conducted with the most comprehensive data file ever compiled on emissions, pollution 
concentrations, defensive expenditures, and mortality rates.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews ozone formation and the 
NBP. Section III presents a simple model of defensive investments. Section IV describes data 
sources and the analysis sample. Section V discusses the econometric models. Section VI reports 
the results and Section VII conducts a cost-benefit analysis of the NBP and develops a measure 
of willingness to pay for ozone reductions. Section VIII concludes. 
 




A. Ambient Pollution. The Clean Air Act was designed to control ambient levels of ozone and 
five other pollutants that harm health. Ozone differs from the other pollutants in two important 
ways. First, polluters do not emit ozone directly. Instead, ambient ozone concentrations are 
governed by complex nonlinear photochemistry that depends on two chemicals precursors – 
nitrogen oxides (NOx) and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) – and sunlight and heat. The 
market we study operates only in summer because winter ozone levels in the Eastern U.S. are 
low, and ozone spikes to high peaks on hot and sunny days.  
 Second, the health consequences of ozone are believed to occur from short-term exposure 
to high levels (Lippman 2009). Ozone regulation has targeted these peak exposures, rather than 
focusing on mean ozone levels. For example, the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for 
ozone primarily reflect the highest few readings of the year. Most epidemiological studies focus 
on very short-term effects, though some evidence suggests that medium- or long-run effects are 
larger (Jerrett et al. 2009). Hence, this market is most likely to affect health if it truncates the 
right tail of the ozone distribution.  
 
B. The NOx Budget Trading Program. As detailed in Appendix IV, an initial version of the NBP 
operated in 1999-2002 and produced small declines in summer NOx emissions that are unlikely 
to confound our analysis of the 2003-2008 NBP (see Appendix IV). A more stringent version of 
the NBP then began in 2003 and operated until 2008.8 This market included 2,500 electricity 
generating units and industrial boilers, though the 700 coal-fired electricity generating units in 
the market accounted for 95 percent of all NBP NOx emissions (USEPA 2009b).  
The NBP market was implemented partially in 2003 and fully in 2004-5. The 2003-2008 
emissions market originally aimed to cover the eight Northeast states plus Washington DC, plus 
11 additional Eastern states. Litigation in the Midwest, however, delayed implementation in the 
                                                 
8 In 2009, the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) replaced this market. In 2010, the EPA proposed a Transport Rule 
which would combine this NOx market with a market for SO2 emissions. In July 2011, the EPA replaced this 
proposal with the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, which regulates power plant emissions in 27 states with the goal of 




11 additional states until May 31, 2004.9 Appendix Figure 1 shows the division of states by NBP 
participation status in the subsequent analysis.10 
Accordingly, the EPA allocated about 150,000 tons of NOx allowances in 2003, 650,000 
tons in 2004, and about 550,000 tons in each of the years 2005-2008.11 Each state received a set 
of permits and chose how to distribute those permits to affected sources. Once permits were 
distributed, affected sources could buy and sell them through open markets. A single emissions 
cap affected the entire market region, though firms could bank allowances for any future year. 
Many firms banked allowances: In each year of the market, about 250,000 tons of allowances 
were saved unused for subsequent years (USEPA 2009a). At the end of each market season, each 
source had to give the EPA one allowance for each ton of NOx emitted. Seventy percent of units 
complied by using emissions controls (e.g., low NOx burners or selective catalytic reduction), 
and the remainder complied exclusively by holding emissions permits (USEPA 2009b). The 
mean resulting permit price in the emissions market was $2,523 per ton of NOx ($2015). This 
reflects the marginal abatement cost of the last unit of NOx abated, and we use it to develop an 
upper bound on the aggregate abatement cost of the NBP. 
 
III. Model of Willingness-to-Pay 
We build upon the canonical Becker-Grossman health production function to highlight the role 
of defensive investments in the measurement of willingness-to-pay for clean air (Becker 1965; 
Grossman 1972). This model shows that accurate measurement of willingness-to-pay requires 
knowledge of both how pollution affects health outcomes such as mortality and how it affects 
defensive investments that maintain health but otherwise generate no utility, such as medications. 
                                                 
9 The 1999-2002 Ozone Transport Commission Market included Connecticut, Delaware, DC, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. On May 1, 2003, the NBP emissions cap 
applied to the exact same set of states. On May 31, 2004, it also began applying to Alabama (excluding a southern 
region of the state), Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, 
Virginia, and West Virginia. Missouri entered the market in 2007.  
10 The main results define all states in the NBP cap-and-trade region as treated, they exclude states that are adjacent 
to NBP states, and they define remaining states as comparison (non-treated). We exclude states adjacent to the NBP 
region from the main results because their treatment status is ambiguous (see Appendix IV for details).  




Assume the sick days s(d) which a person suffers depends on the dose d of pollution she 
is exposed to. The effective dose d(c,a) depends on the ambient concentration c of the pollutant 
and on the defensive behavior a. Defensive behaviors can be taken before or after pollution is 
ingested—in the terminology of Graff-Zivin and Neidell (2013), defenses include both averting 
and mitigating activities. Substituting provides the following health production function: 
(1) s = s(c,a) 
People gain utility from consumption of a general good X (whose price is normalized to 
1), leisure f, and health. Budgets are constrained by non-labor income I, the wage rate pw, 
available time T, and the price pa of defensive investments: maxX,f,au(X,f,s) s.t. I + pw(T – f – s) ≥ 
X + paa. Assuming an interior solution to the maximization problem, we can rearrange the total 
derivative of the health production function (1) to give the following expression for the partial 
effect of ambient pollution on sick days: 
 (2)  
This expression is useful because it underscores that the partial derivative of sick days with 
respect to pollution is equal to the sum of the total derivative and the product of the partial 
derivative of sick days with respect to defensive behavior (assumed to have a negative sign) and 
the partial derivative of defensive behavior with respect to pollution (assumed to have a positive 
sign). In general, complete data on defensive behavior is unavailable, so most empirical 
investigations of pollution on health (see, e.g., Chay and Greenstone 2003) reveal ds/dc, rather 
than ∂s/∂a. As equation (5) demonstrates, the total derivative is an underestimate of the desired 
partial derivative. Indeed, it is possible that virtually all of the response to a change in pollution 
comes through changes in defensive behavior and that there is little impact on health outcomes; 
in this case, an exclusive focus on the total derivative would lead to a substantial understatement 
of the health effect of pollution. The full impact therefore requires either estimation of ∂s∂da, 
which is almost always infeasible, or of ds/dc and ∂a*/∂c. We emphasize that defenses used both 

























indistinguishable in the willingness-to-pay expression (2). From the view of social welfare, the 
distinction between them is not relevant. 
 To express the marginal willingness to pay for clean air wc in dollars, we manipulate the 
previous expressions to obtain the following decomposition: 
(3)  
Expression (3) shows that the marginal willingness to pay for clean air includes three terms. The 
first is the effect of pollution on productive work time, valued at the wage rate. The third is the 
disutility of sickness, valued in dollars. This third component includes mortality. The second is 
the cost of defensive investments, valued at their market price. This second component is the 
aspect of willingness-to-pay that existing research has not measured. It is important to note that 
medications are not a complete measure of defensive investments against air pollution. The 
paper’s primary empirical goal is to develop a measure of marginal willingness to pay that is 
based on ds/dc and ∂a*∂/c. 
Our setting has two important deviations from this neoclassical model: markups and 
moral hazard. Branded medications generally have low marginal cost and high markups that 
reflect intellectual property rights. Hence, it is natural to question whether changes in medication 
purchases amount to a transfer from consumers to drug firms, and not a social cost. In the short-
run, this is indeed the case. However, pharmaceutical firms must invest socially valuable 
resources to develop medications that treat conditions exacerbated by air pollution. With lower 
levels of air pollution, fewer resources would be spent to develop these medications. Thus over 
the long run, there is a social benefit (see Finkelstein 2004) for a similar induced innovation 
process. 
The second important deviation is that the marginal cost to the consumer is smaller than 
the price, by 80 percent in our data, because consumers with insurance generally pay a 
copayment or deductible for medications. We report medication cost results both using the full 
































and using the copayment. The copayment may provide the best measure of a person’s private 
willingness-to-pay for her own medications. Since an insurer must pay the remainder of the 
medication cost, the full cost of the medication may more accurately represent social-
willingness-to-pay for the cost of the medications.  
  
IV. Data 
This analysis has compiled an unprecedented set of data files to assess the impacts of the NOx 
Budget Program. Although market-based instruments are viewed as among the most important 
contributions of economics to environmental policy, to the best of our knowledge this study 
represents the first time any analysis has linked ex post health measurements directly to 
emissions and air quality measures in order to evaluate an emissions market. 
Medications. We use confidential data on medication and hospital admissions from 
MarketScan. MarketScan contracts with large employers to obtain all insurance-related records 
for their employees and their dependents including children. The data report the purchase county, 
date, the medication’s National Drug Code (NDC), and the money paid from consumer and 
insurer to the medication provider.  
We use data from all persons in the 19 covered firms which appear in all years, 2001-
2007, of MarketScan, which is the largest panel the data allow us to obtain with these firms. This 
extract includes over 22 million person-season year observations, and over 100 million separate 
medication purchases. Because the distribution of persons across counties is skewed, we report 
all values as rates per 1,000 people, and use generalized least squares (GLS) weights equal to the 
square root of the relevant MarketScan population. Because the other datasets become available 
in 1997 but medication data become available in 2001, for non-medication results we report 
parameter estimates both with data for the period 1997-2007 and for the period 2001-2007. 
Medications are not linked to a single International Classification of Disease (ICD) code. 
In the subsequent analysis, we follow the convention in the pollution-health literature and treat 




define an NDC as respiratory if it satisfies any of three criteria: (1) if it is listed in the Third 
Treatment Guidelines for Asthma (NHLBI 2007); (2) in a recent New England Journal of 
Medicine guide to asthma treatment (Fanta 2009); or (3) in the standard industry publication for 
medication characteristics (PDR 2006) as indicated for asthma, emphysema, bronchitis, or 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder. We identify cardiovascular medications by their 
corresponding therapeutic group in Red Book (PDR 2006).12  
This broad approach to identifying respiratory and cardiovascular drugs is the most 
appropriate we can discern. Nonetheless, because doctors prescribe medications to treat 
conditions for which the medications are not indicated, some of these medications were probably 
prescribed for non-respiratory and non-cardiovascular conditions. Moreover, it is also likely that 
medications prescribed for respiratory and cardiovascular conditions are not in this list. For 
example, the three sources mentioned above that we use to define respiratory medications have 
somewhat different categorization of which medications are respiratory. Internet searches for 
respiratory medications also find medications which can be used for respiratory conditions, but 
which are not listed as respiratory in any of the sources above.13 Additionally, Red Book 
identifies a single therapeutic group for each National Drug Code. Since a medication may be 
used to treat multiple conditions, medications in non-cardiovascular therapeutic groups may also 
be used to treat cardiovascular conditions. 
Hospitalizations. We count hospital admission costs as including all inpatient episodes 
plus all emergency outpatient episodes. When a hospital visit has several associated procedures 
each with its own ICD9 code, we take the mode procedure. Our measure of hospital costs 
includes all charges from the hospital to the insurer and patient. 
                                                 
12 Red Book has no category for respiratory medications. Medication purchase rates are skewed and few county-
season values equal zero, so the main tables report medication regressions in logs, with values of zero excluded from 
the regressions.  
13 For example, dexamethasone is not listed as respiratory in any of our sources, but medical websites like the Mayo 
Clinic’s list it is as used to treat asthma along with many other conditions including inflammation, allergies, arthritis, 
blood or bone marrow problems, kidney problems, skin conditions, and multiple sclerosis. Similarly, isoflurane is 
not listed as a respiratory condition in our data, as it is primarily used for anesthesia, but many medical journal 




Mortality. To measure mortality, we use restricted-access data on the universe of deaths 
in the 1997-2007 period. These Multiple Cause of Death files (MCOD) come from the National 
Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) and were accessed through an agreement between NCHS 
and the Census Research Data Centers. These files contain information on the county, cause of 
death, demographics, and date of each fatality.  
Pollution Emissions. To measure pollution emissions, we extract daily totals of unit-level 
NOx, SO2, and CO2 emissions for all states from the EPA’s Clean Air Markets Division. The 
NOx emissions almost entirely come from CEMS and are quite accurate. Units which are part of 
the Acid Rain Program must report NOx emissions throughout the year, while units in the NBP 
must report NOx emissions only in the May 1 – September 30 period. Because we compare 
summer versus winter and East versus West, estimates in the paper use only data from Acid Rain 
Units. However, in the examined period, units in the NBP and not in the Acid Rain Program 
make a very small share of NOx emissions.  
 Ambient Pollution. We use a few criteria to select ambient pollution monitoring data from 
the EPA’s detailed Air Quality System. Many EPA monitors operate for limited timespans and 
may change reporting frequency in response to pollution (Henderson 1996). The main analysis 
uses a fairly strenuous selection rule of limiting to monitors which have valid readings for at 
least 47 weeks in all years 1997-2007. Appendix Table 1 shows that we obtain similar results 
with a weaker monitor selection rule. For ozone, we focus on a concentration measure the EPA 
regulates: for each day, we calculate an “8-hour value” as the maximum rolling 8-hour mean 
within the day. We also calculate the number of days on which this 8-hour value was equal to or 
greater than 65 ppb, which is an indicator of high-ozone days.  
Weather. We compiled daily maximum and minimum temperature, total daily 
precipitation, and dew point temperature data from records of the National Climate Data Center 
Summary of the Day files (File TD-3200). Appendix III explains the procedure chosen to ensure 




Summary Statistics. Table 1 shows the means, standard deviations, and county 
representation for the main variables in our analysis. Of the 2,539 counties in our preferred 
sample, medication and hospitalization data are available for 96 percent of these counties, which 
had a population of 261 million in 2004.14 Ambient ozone data are only available for only 168 
counties, but these counties are heavily populated and their 2004 population was 97 million. Data 
on particulates less than 2.5 micrometers (PM2.5) are available in 298 counties (population 144 
million) and data on particulates less than 10 micrometers (PM10) are available for 39 counties 
(population of 26 million).  
The summary statistics in Table 1 also provide a benchmark to measure the economic 
importance of medications and the emissions market. In summer, ozone averages 48 ppb. The 
2010 proposed EPA air quality standard stipulated that a county could have no more than 3 days 
over a total of three years which exceed 60-70 ppb. Table 1 shows that during the sample period, 
24 days every summer exceed 65 ppb in the typical county. On average during this time, the 
average person spent $378 per summer on medications, and about $600 on hospital admissions.  
In unreported results, we also investigated potential unobserved variables in the 
observational associations between ozone and health. We divided all counties with ozone data 
into two sets—one set with mean summer ozone above the national median (“high ozone”), and 
another with mean summer ozone below the national median (“low ozone”). All ambient 
pollutant measures except carbon monoxide have significantly higher levels in the high-ozone 
counties. Temperature, precipitation, and dew point temperature are lower in high-ozone 
counties. The finding that so many of these observed county characteristics covary with ozone 
suggests that an observational association of ozone with health is likely to reflect the 
contributions of other unobserved variables and may explain the instability of the estimated 
health-ozone relationship that has plagued the previous literature. It is apparent that the 
estimation of the causal effect of NOx emissions and ozone on health and defensive expenditures 
                                                 
14 While the U.S. has about 3,000 counties, our working sample is smaller since as discussed earlier, the main 




requires a research design that isolates variation in NOx and ozone that is independent of 
potential confounders.  
 
V. Econometric Model 
We use a differences-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) estimator to isolate the causal effects 
of the emissions market on pollution, defensive investments, and health, and use instrumental 
variables to measure the “structural” effect of NOx emissions and ozone on the same outcomes. 
The DDD estimator exploits three sources of variation in the emission and health data. First, we 
compare the years before and after the NBP’s operation. Eight states plus Washington DC 
initiated this market in 2003, while 11 other states joined in 2004. This market did not operate 
before 2003. Second, 19 states plus Washington DC participated in the NBP while twenty-two 
other states did not participate and were not adjacent to a NBP state (see Appendix Figure 1). 
Third, the NBP market only operated during the summer, so we compare summer versus winter.  
Specifically, we estimate the following model: 
(7)  
Here, c references county, s indicates season, and t denotes year. The year is divided into 
two seasons, summer and winter. Summer matches the NBP’s operation period of May 1-
September 30. The variables  are pollution emissions, ambient pollution concentrations, 
medication costs, hospitalization costs, and mortality rates. Because the NBP market started 
partway in 2003, we define Post=0.5 in 2003 and Post=1.0 in 2004 through 2007. Appendix 
Tables 1, 2, and 4 show similar results for all natural alternatives to this definition. All 
regressions limit the sample to a balanced panel of county-season-years. Our main results cluster 
standard errors by state-season, but the Appendix reports alternative levels of clustering, with 
similar conclusions. 
Since temperature has nonlinear effects on health, it is important to adjust for weather 
flexibly. The matrix of weather controls, Wcst, includes measures of precipitation, temperature, 







and dew point temperature (a measure of humidity). For temperature and humidity, we calculate 
20 quantiles of the overall daily distribution.15 For each county-season-year observation in the 
data, we then calculate the share of days that fall into each of the 20 quantiles. 
To operationalize the DDD estimator, the specification includes all three sets of two-way 
fixed effects. The vector μct is a complete set of county by year fixed effects, which account for 
all factors common to a county within a year (e.g., local economic activity and the quality of 
local health care providers). The season-by-year fixed effects, ηst, control for all factors common 
to a season and year: for example, they would adjust for the development of a new drug to treat 
asthma that was sold in NBP and non-NBP states. Finally, the county-by-season fixed effects, 
νcs, allow for permanent differences in outcomes across county-by seasons. This specification 
estimates the difference in outcomes between a world with all NOx regulations including the 
NBP (including the Ozone Transport Commission market, RECLAIM, ozone nonattainment 
designations, and others) versus a world with all NOx regulations except the NBP. Other 
regulations did apply to NOx emissions from power plants in this period; for example, the 
Massachusetts State Implementation Plan adopted strict annual (though not summer-only) NOx 
emissions standards for power plants in 2001, which began applying between 2004 and 2008. 
Such policies help explain the downward trends observed in both Winter and in non-NBP states 
in Appendix Figure 2. Our identifying assumption is that such policies did not change 
differentially in NBP versus non-NBP states, in Winter versus Summer, over this period. 
The parameter of interest is γ1, associated with the variable 1(NBP Operating)cst. As noted 
earlier, this takes the value of 0.5 for all NBP states in 2003, when the market was operating in 9 
of the 20 states, and a value of 1 in 2004 and all subsequent years in these states. The 2003 value 
is assigned to all NBP states, rather than just states which entered the market in 2003, because 
NOx and ozone travel far and emissions reductions in one NBP state affected ambient ozone in 
other NBP states. After adjustment for the fixed effects, γ1 captures the variation in outcomes 
                                                 
15 The lower quantiles of the precipitation distribution all equal zero, so for simplicity we specify the precipitation 




specific to NBP states, relative to non-NBP states, in years when the NBP operated, relative to 
before its initiation, and in the summer, relative to the winter. This only leaves variation in the 
outcomes at the level at which the market operated.  
 Separate measures of the market’s effect in each year provide additional useful 









cstcsstctcstcstcst WSummerandStateNBPY   
where 1(NBP State and Summer)cs=1 for all summer observations from NBP states, regardless of 
the year. We plot the αt’s in event study style figures to provide visual evidence on the validity of 
the conclusions from the estimation of equation (7).16 Importantly, the event study style graphs 
provide an opportunity to assess whether there were pre-NPB trends in outcomes that were 
specific to NBP States after nonparametric adjustment for all county by year, season by year, and 
county by season factors. Appendix Figure 4 reports 20 separate event study graphs that cover all 
main outcomes in the paper. 
 Finally, we report on the results from the estimation of instrumental variables versions of 
(9) cstcsstctcstcstcst WNOxY  
'  
where the subscripts have the same meaning as in equations (7) and (8) and the equation includes 
the same set of fixed effects. Here, Ycst is restricted to measures of medication purchases and 
mortality rates. The key difference is that NOx emissions in county c, season s, and year t is an 
endogenous regressor and 1(NBP Operating)cst from equation (7) is used as an instrumental 
variable. We demonstrate below that there is a strong first-stage in that the instrumental variable 
predicts NOx emissions. The exclusion restriction is the other necessary condition for a valid 
instrumental variable and, conditional on the full set of two-way fixed effects, we believe that it 
                                                 
16 The data on medication purchases and hospitalization begins in 2001, so for these outcomes, the event-study 




is credible to assume that 1(NBP Operating)cst only affects medication purchases and mortality 
rates through NOx emissions.  
The case for the validity of the exclusion restriction when ozone is the endogenous 
variable is plausible. However, it is less clear cut for two reasons: 1) the link between the NBP 
and ambient ozone is less direct since it is mediated by complex nonlinear photochemistry and 
this can make for a noisy relationship; and 2) air quality models show that atmospheric NOx can 
transform into particulates air pollution that is harmful to human health (Pandis and Seinfeld 
2006). Nevertheless, there is a straightforward channel and we also report on versions of 
equation (9) where ambient ozone, instead of NOx emissions, is the endogenous variable, and 
1(NBP Operating)cst is the instrumental variable. Reliable estimation of either, or both, versions 
of equation (9) would be of tremendous practical value for policy and, more broadly, so that this 
paper’s results can be applied to other settings. 
 
VI. Results 
A. Emissions. The NOx Budget Trading Program required affected units to reduce NOx emissions 
during the summer. Figure 2 (A) shows an event study graph measuring the difference between 
NOx emissions in the Eastern and Western U.S. and in summer versus winter, separately by year, 
with the year 2002 normalized to take the value zero. The value for 2001 is almost exactly equal 
to zero, which is consistent with a lack of pre-trends in NOx emissions. Figure 2 (A) shows that 
in the year 2003, when the NBP market began, NOx emissions fell by 0.2 thousand tons per 
county-season-year; and by the later years of the NBP, NOx emissions had fallen by a total of 0.3 
to 0.4 thousand tons per county-season-year. Panel A of Table 2 reports estimates of several 
versions of equation (7) for pollution emissions measured at the county by season by year level. 
Column (1) includes county-by-season, season-by-year, and state-by-year fixed effects. Column 
(2) adds binned weather controls. Column (3) replaces the state-by-year fixed effects with 
county-by-year fixed effects, which causes the parameters of interest to be identified from 




sample to 2001-2007, which are the when medication and hospitalization data are available. 
Since emissions readings are totals rather than averages, the regressions are unweighted.  
The entries in row 1 report the parameter estimate and standard error associated with the 
variable 1(NBP Operating)cst. The results suggest that the NBP market decreased NOx emissions 
in the average county by 330-430 tons. This corresponds to a total decrease of between 391,000 
and 510,000 tons of NOx per summer.  
It is informative to compare these statistics against other reports of the NBP’s impacts on 
NOx emissions. The USEPA (2008) estimates that a combination of the NBP and its smaller 
predecessor, the NOx SIP Call, decreased ozone season NOx emissions by a larger amount, 
750,000 tons. Their estimate comes from a time-series comparison of the years 2000 and 2007. 
Reconciling this with our smaller estimate is straightforward. A time-series comparison of the 
years 2002 and 2007 implies a smaller decrease of somewhat over 500,000 tons. Accounting for 
secular trends in emissions, which were present in both summer and winter seasons and in the 
NBP and non-NBP states (Appendix Figure 2), suggests an estimate within our range of 391,000 
to 510,000 tons.17  
We also measure whether the NBP market affected emissions of pollutants other than 
NOx. Two economic reasons explain why the market might have affected emissions of such co-
pollutants. If permits for NOx emissions cost enough that the market caused natural gas units to 
displace electricity generation from relatively dirty coal-fired units, then the market could have 
decreased emissions of pollutants other than NOx. Second, complementarity or substitutability of 
NOx with other pollutants in electricity generation could lead units to change emissions of other 
pollutants. Rows 2 and 3 in Panel A of Table 2 indicate that NBP did not substantially affect SO2 
or CO2 emissions. Our preferred estimates in column (3) are not statistically significant, though 
                                                 
17 Our emissions totals are not numerically equal to those of at least the EPA’s year 2008 NBP report for a few 
reasons: their report describes Missouri sources as regulated by an NBP in all years (whereas in reality those sources 
were only regulated in 2007; we exclude Missouri from our main analysis); we treat all of Alabama as in the NBP 
while they exclude some sources in southern Alabama; and we include only Acid Rain Units in the analysis since 
they have high-quality continuous emissions monitoring systems (CEMS) data for summer and winter and pre-NBP 
years, while the EPA’s reports, which focus only on summer emissions, also include the fairly few NBP sources that 




some of the other estimates are. However, all of the estimates are economically small; for 
example, the point estimates in the preferred specifications in columns (3) and (4) are about 3% 
to 5% of the mean from years 2001-2, or a tenth of our proportional estimate for NOx. Event 
study graphs in Appendix Figure 4(B) suggest quantitatively similar conclusions. The SO2 graph, 
for example, suggests a decrease of 0.1 thousand tons per county-season, and the CO2 graph 
suggests a decrease of approximately 20 thousand tons per county-season.  
 
B. Ambient Pollution. Panel B in Table 2 reports on how the NBP affected ambient 
concentrations of ozone and the other pollutants that are most heavily regulated under the Clean 
Air Act. Columns (1) – (4) have identical specifications to those in Panel A, except that they are 
weighted by the number of pollution readings from the EPA’s ambient air quality monitors in a 
given year by county. The column (5) estimates are from the same specification as in column (4), 
except that they are weighted by county population, which will be the relevant weight in the 
analysis of the impact of the NBP market on health outcomes (though defensive investments are 
weighted by the population in the MarketScan survey).  
Rows 4 and 5 of in Panel B reveal large and precisely estimated effects of the emissions 
market on ground-level ozone concentrations (as measured by the maximum 8-hour value). The 
richest specifications in columns (3) - (5) indicate that the NBP decreased mean summer ozone 
by about 3 ppb (or 6% relative to the baseline average). Importantly, the NBP also decreased the 
number of high-ozone days (days where the 8-hour value equals or exceeds 65 ppb) by 8.0 to 9.6 
days per summer (or 33%-40% of the baseline average). The corresponding event study figure 
for the 8-hour ozone reading (Appendix Figure 3 C) exhibits some evidence of differential pre-
existing trends in summer ozone concentrations in NBP states. Accounting for these differences 
increases the magnitude of the NBP’s estimated reduction on ozone concentrations, although 
these models are more demanding of the data and so the estimates are less precise, but remain 




Given the large effect of the NBP on the number of days with ozone equaling or 
exceeding 65 ppb, we also analyze the market’s impact on the density function for daily ozone 
concentrations to explore where in the daily ozone distribution the NBP affected concentrations. 
Figure 2 (B) reports these results; the main finding is that the market reduced the number of 
summer days with relatively high-ozone concentrations (i.e. greater than 60 ppb) and increased 
the number of days with ozone concentrations less than 60 ppb. It is noteworthy that the EPA has 
experimented with daily ozone standards of 65, 75, and 85 ppb in recent years and that the 
identifying variation in ozone concentrations comes from this part of the distribution where there 
is great scientific and policy uncertainty.18 
 Rows 6-8 in Panel B of Table 2 test for impacts of NBP on carbon monoxide (CO), 
sulfur dioxide (SO2), and nitrogen dioxide (NO2). Appendix Figure 4(B) shows the 
corresponding event study graphs. CO emissions come primarily from transportation, so it is not 
surprising that the regressions fail to find evidence that the NBP affected CO emissions; the 
graphs bear this out. Further, there is no regression evidence of an impact on SO2, though the 
event study graph has some evidence of pre-trends differences for this outcome. NOx is a 
standard term used to describe a mix of two compounds—nitric oxide (NO) and NO2, a pollutant 
subject to its own regulations. Row 8 shows that the NBP market decreased ambient NO2 levels 
by 6-7 percent, relative to the baseline, though NO2 has limited or possibly no effect on health 
(Lippman 2009). The event study graph shows some decrease though is less clear than for ozone. 
 The impact of the NBP on particulates concentrations is of special interest because 
particulates can result from NOx emissions and are widely believed to be the most dangerous air 
pollutant for human health (Pope, Ezzati, and Dockery 2009; Chay and Greenstone 2003; Chen 
et al 2013). Further, before its implementation, the EPA estimated that 48-53 percent of the 
projected health benefits from the NBP would come through the channel of reduced particulates 
                                                 
18 Appendix Figure 3 (A) shows the number of days with ozone in each of six bins in the years before the NBP 
program began. Appendix Figure 3 (B) shows event study graphs of the change in these counts due to the NBP. 
These graphs also show that the change in ozone was largely among days with 60-100ppb, which are exactly the set 




concentrations (USEPA 1998). The impact of emitted NOx on ambient particulate matter is 
theoretically ambiguous and depends on the level of other chemicals in the atmosphere (see 
Appendix I). 
Rows 9 and 10 of Panel B in Table 2 empirically examine the impact of the NBP market 
on the concentrations of particles smaller than 10 micrometers (PM10) and 2.5 micrometers 
(PM2.5), both of which are small enough to be respirable. The PM10 and PM2.5 monitoring 
networks were just being erected in the late 1990s so to have meaningful samples it is necessary 
to focus on the 2001-2007 period as in columns (4) and (5). Column (4), where the equation is 
weighted by the number of monitor observations, provides limited evidence that the NBP 
affected particulate matter. Alternatively, when the equation is weighted by population, as is the 
case in the preferred defensive expenditures and health outcomes equations, the NBP is 
associated with a 7% reduction in PM2.5. Because PM2.5 is believed to create substantial health 
damages, however, the implications of this number for human health may be larger than this 
modest change in ambient concentrations might suggest. In the smaller sample of counties with 
PM10 monitors, we fail to find evidence of a statistically significant change in PM10. The row 9 
and 10 results are inconclusive about whether the NBP affected particulates concentrations. The 
event study graphs in Appendix Figure 4(B) also show no clear evidence of a decrease in 
ambient particulates. 
Overall, the large reduction in NOx emissions caused by the NBP market and the rest of 
the evidence in Table 2 is generally supportive of the premise that the effect of the NBP on 
health occurs primarily through its effect on ozone concentrations (see additional sensitivity 
analyses in Appendix V). Emissions of pollutants with important effects on health such as CO 
and SO2 were unaffected by the NBP. However, the mixed estimates of the effect of the NBP on 
PM2.5 (some statistically significant, some not) suggest that the subsequent 2SLS estimates of the 
effects of ozone on defensive expenditures and health outcomes derived from the variation in 
ozone induced by the NBP should be interpreted cautiously, because they may reflect the impact 




instrumental variables estimates of the effects of NOx emissions on medication purchases and 
mortality. 
 
C. Defensive Investments. Table 3 statistically summarizes the reduced-form effect of the NBP 
market on log medication costs. The richest specification in columns (3) and (4) indicates that 
the NBP reduced total medication costs by 1.5 to 1.6 percent. The estimate is precise with the 
full set of controls and has similar magnitude but less precision with less detailed controls.19 
Finally, it is worth noting that the column (4) estimate is derived from the subsample of counties 
with ozone pollution monitors, which is used for the instrumental variables estimation below; 
this reduces the sample size from 30,926 to 2,338. 
Figure 3 (A) shows the event study graph for log of respiratory and cardiovascular 
medication expenditures from the estimation of equation (8). The event study suggests that the 
NBP market decreased medication expenditures in these categories by nearly 2 percentage 
points. This impact was roughly constant and is marginally significant in individual years. 
Importantly, there is no evidence of meaningful differences in the trend in summertime 
medication purchases between NBP and non-NBP states in advance of the market’s initiation. 
The picture is broadly similar though less precise for the smaller set of firms available over the 
period 2000-2007 (Appendix Figure 4B). 
We also measure medication purchases separately by cause. As discussed above, the 
allocation of medications to causes is inexact—doctors can prescribe a medication for many 
purposes, and the MarketScan data do not identify the cause for which a specific medication was 
prescribed. The goal of this exercise is to test whether the decline in medication purchases was 
evident among respiratory and cardiovascular medications (although the imprecision of the 
assignment of causes to medications means that there are good reasons to expect an impact in 
                                                 
19 County-by-year fixed effects add precision in these estimates. Because the medication data are from MarketScan 
and represent workers in the balanced panel of firms, county-by-year fixed effects address both local labor market 
shocks and firm- and factory-specific events like layoffs or mass hiring. Consistent with GLS providing an efficient 
response to heteroscedasticity, the unweighted estimate for log medication costs per capita is similar but less precise, 




other categories). The column (3) estimate in row 2 indicates that the NBP decreased 
expenditures on respiratory and cardiovascular medications by a statistically significant 2.1 
percent. In the smaller sample of counties with ozone monitors in column (4), the point estimate 
is marginally different from zero and a similar point estimate to column (3). Expenditures on all 
other medications also declined in all specifications. In the richest specification of column (3), 
this decline is 1.4 percentage points and is modestly smaller than the decline for respiratory and 
cardiovascular medications. Event study graphs for non-cardiovascular and non-respiratory 
medications show much less evidence of a change than is apparent for cardiovascular and 
respiratory medications (Appendix Figure 4B). 
 An important question is the extent to which medications are a defense rather than just 
another health expense. Almost all of the previous literature reports on direct health outcomes 
(e.g., mortality rates, incidence of asthma attacks, and lung functioning). Following guidance 
from the medical literature (e.g., Fanta 2009), our paper’s argument is that all of these health 
conditions are a function of ambient pollution and compensatory adaptations or defenses that 
include pharmaceutical purchases and a wide range of other costly actions. The share of 
willingness-to-pay accounted for by these defenses has essentially been unmeasured previously 
across a wide variety of settings; as a result, current measures of willingness to pay are 
incomplete and downward biased by an unknown magnitude. Appendix II discusses this question 
in detail, and while we argue that all medications are defensive, Appendix Table 2 reports results 
indicating that the NBP led to reductions in purchases of both short-acting acute and long-acting 
control respiratory medications; only the long-term control estimate is statistically significant.  
 
D. Hospital Visits and Mortality.  
Hospital Visits. Because we seek to compare defensive costs against direct health costs, 
we also measure how the market affected hospital visits and mortality. Due to the large number 
of county-year-season observations with zero hospitalization costs, we focus on the level rather 




 Overall, our conclusion from these results is that we do not detect meaningful effects of 
the NBP on hospitalization costs and we do not pursue this outcome further (Appendix Table 3). 
We emphasize however that the MarketScan data exclude uninsured, Medicare, and Medicaid 
patients. These groups are included in some studies which find effects of ozone on 
hospitalization (Currie and Neidell 2005, Lleras-Muney 2010), and are believed to experience 
the largest impacts from high ambient ozone levels (ALA 2013). For these reasons, estimates of 
the effect of the NBP market on hospitalization (and potentially medications) could significantly 
understate population average effects.20 
 Mortality. In most analyses of air pollution, mortality accounts for the largest share of the 
regulatory benefits. The results in row 1 of Table 4 suggest that the NBP market decreased the 
all-cause, all-age summertime mortality rate by about 1.5 to 2.2 deaths per 100,000 population, 
depending on the sample, and would generally be judged to be statistically significant. The effect 
in the subsample of counties with ozone monitors is larger (see column 4), indicating a reduction 
of 5.2 deaths per 100,000 population.  
Rows 2 through 4 of Table 4 divide the overall mortality rate by cause of death. Reading 
across row 2, it is apparent that 32% to 57% of the decline in overall mortality is concentrated 
among cardiovascular/respiratory deaths. Row 3 finds that the NBP also significantly decreased 
death from non-respiratory and non-cardiovascular causes. In most specifications the difference 
between the effects in rows 2 and rows 3 is smaller than one standard error, and the estimates are 
statistically indistinguishable.  
Research on other pollutants finds that most of the health consequences of particulate 
matter are concentrated among respiratory and cardiovascular causes, although pathways for 
ozone are less well understood. The finding that the NBP affected respiratory and cardiovascular 
in addition to other causes is consistent with two hypotheses. One is that the NBP was correlated 
with unobserved shocks which affected mortality, and the second hypothesis is that the NBP 
                                                 
20 At the same time, the MarketScan medication and hospitalizations data include insured groups that may be more 




itself caused these changes in mortality. Row 4 of Table 4 provides an important fact in support 
of the second hypothesis. Row 4 shows that the market had no effect on external (primarily 
accidental) deaths, which is a reassuring placebo test.  
 Panel C of Table 4 breaks the entire population into four age groups and separately 
estimates the effect of the NBP on each group’s mortality rate using the full sample. The richest 
sample and specification in column (3) detects no statistically significant effect on the mortality 
of persons aged 74 and below, although the point estimates imply that the market prevented 424 
deaths within this group. The largest impact on mortality occurs among people aged 75 and 
older. These results suggest that the NBP market prevented about 1,800 deaths each summer 
among people 75 and older. This finding is confirmed visually by the event study graph in Figure 
3 (B), although the estimates from individual years are noisy, and by the age-specific analyses in 
Appendix Figure 4(B). 
The age-group decomposition implies that the NBP prevented 2,237 summer deaths 
annually. About 80 percent of these were among people aged over 75. By contrast, the overall 
share of all summer deaths which occur among people aged over 75 is 55%, suggesting that the 
elderly disproportionately benefited from the NBP. 
An important question that Table 4 leaves unanswered is the gain in life expectancy 
associated with these delayed fatalities. Indeed, the question of the magnitude of gains in life 
expectancy is unanswered in almost all of the air pollution and health literature because it is 
largely based on changes in mortality rates over relatively short periods of time (e.g., a few days 
or a week). The difficulty is that it is possible and perhaps likely that the relatively sick benefited 
and that their lifespans were extended only modestly, given their age. In the extreme, the NBP 
might merely have moved the date of these deaths to the winter months immediately following 
the market.21  
                                                 
21 The paper’s triple difference estimator compares summer and winter deaths within a year. If some of the deaths 





We explored two approaches to investigate the empirical relevance of this short-term 
‘seasonal’ displacement hypothesis. First, we experimented with redefining each “year” to begin 
on May 1 of one calendar year and conclude on April 30 of the following calendar year. This 
redefined “year” compares each summertime season against the seven following months. 
Second, we estimated differences-in-differences regressions where each observation represents a 
calendar year (as opposed to a calendar-season-year), and where we measure the change in 
mortality rates by NBP status pre vs. post. We also combined these two approaches to estimate 
differences-in-differences models with the restructured year.  
These approaches do not provide strong support for the short-term displacement 
hypothesis. In most cases, the estimated effect of the market on mortality was negative and had 
similar magnitude to the models reported in the paper, but these estimates were imprecise and we 
could not reject the null hypothesis that the NBP had no long-run impact on mortality. Overall, 
we conclude that this research design lacks power to measure the effect of ozone on life 
expectancy beyond the five month length of the NBP’s summer season. Nevertheless, this 
paper’s focus on the summertime mortality rate is an advance from the previous literature that 
has primarily estimated how ozone affects same-day or same-week mortality rates.22  
 
E. Instrumental Variables (IV). The preceding sections measure the reduced-form effects of the 
NBP market on pollution, defenses, and health. We now turn to an IV approach to measuring the 
effect of NOx emissions and ozone on defensive expenditures and mortality rates. The 
interpretation of the IV estimates of the effect of NOx generated by the NBP market variation as 
causal is straightforward: NOx is a pollutant controlled by regulation, and the estimated effects 
on health and defenses are a direct result of the quasi-experimental change in NOx emissions. 
Table 2 showed that changes in NOx are the primary channel for the large changes in ambient 
ozone concentrations. However, changes in NOx – depending on the model specification -- also 
                                                 




can lead to changes in other ambient pollutants, including PM2.5. Thus we underscore that 
instrumental variable estimates of the effect of ozone should be interpreted more cautiously.  
We report IV estimates for the effect of NOx on health for two different geographic 
samples—all counties and the 24% of NBP counties with positive NOx emissions in summer 
2002 that account for 44% of these states’ population. We refer to the second sample as, 
“Counties with NOx Emissions.” Most counties lack power plants that produce NOx emissions so 
the NBP could not have affected emissions in these counties, except by deterring entry; relatedly, 
the first-stage estimate of the NBP’s effect on NOx is more powerful when excluding these zeros. 
We emphasize estimates from the second sample, since it is ex ante expected to have more 
statistical power. Of course we can only estimate IV regressions for ozone using the counties 
with ozone monitors. 
The first row of Panel A of Table 5 reports fixed effects estimates of the association 
between NOx emissions and medication purchases (columns 1 - 2) and between measures of the 
all-age mortality rate (columns 3 – 4). Rows 2 and 3 repeat the exercise for two different 
measures of ambient ozone. The estimates are from separate regressions of the outcome on 
alternative measures of NOx emissions (or ozone concentrations) and are adjusted for county-by-
season fixed effects, county-by-year fixed effects, season-by-year fixed effects, detailed weather 
controls, and each observation represents a county-year-season as in the prior analysis. Most of 
these estimates are statistically insignificant, and exhibit sign and magnitude variability 
(including perversely signed coefficients on mortality), suggesting little evidence of systematic 
effects on medication purchases or mortality rates. 
Panel B reports on the two-stage least squares (2SLS) or instrumental variables (IV) 
estimates that are adjusted for the same controls as in the fixed effects specifications but the 
endogenous variables (i.e., NOx emissions in thousands of tons, average 8-hour ozone 
concentration, and the number of days equaling or exceeding 65 ppb) are instrumented using the 
quasi-experimental variation generated by the NBP market. That is, we use the variable 1(NBP 




The entries indicate a strong relationship between NOx emissions and medication 
purchases. For example, the estimates based on the sample of counties with positive NOx 
emissions imply that a 10 percentage point decline in NOx emissions relative to the Table 1 mean 
of 0.52 leads to a 0.07 percentage point reduction in spending on all medications. The estimates 
including all counties are larger, at 0.14 percentage points, though less precise. Both estimates 
are substantially larger in magnitude than the analogous OLS ones in Panel A, which is 
consistent with the possibilities that the OLS estimates are plagued by substantial confounding 
and that NOx emissions are measured with error. The ozone entries imply that a 10 percentage 
point decline in the average 8 hour ozone measure and a 10 percentage point decline in days with 
ozone concentrations exceeding 65 ppb reduces all medication spending by 2.8 and 0.37 
percentage points, respectively (both statistically significant).  
The IV mortality estimates in columns (4) also imply large mortality effects of NOx 
emissions and ozone concentrations.23 The estimates based on counties with NOx emissions 
suggest that a 1 million ton increase in NOx emissions leads to 5 additional summertime deaths 
per 100,000 people, or that a 10 percentage point decline in NOx leads to a reduction in the 
mortality rate of 0.07 percentage points. The estimates for all counties are the same magnitude 
though somewhat less precise. The estimates also indicate that a 1 ppb increase in the 8 hour 
ozone concentration or 1 additional day with a concentration exceeding 65 ppb lead to 2.62 and 
0.86 additional summertime deaths per 100,000 people, respectively; correspondingly, a 10 
percentage point increase in 8-hour ozone or in days with ozone concentrations exceeding 65 ppb 
                                                 
23 The first-stage regression for column (3) of Table 5 corresponds to column (5) of Table 2. For the other columns 
of Table 5, the first stage regressions are as follows: for column (1), -0.704 (0.303); for column (2a), -1.500 (0.518); 
for column (2b), -0.107 (0.051); for column (4a), -0.876 (0.274); for column (4b), -0.237 (0.095). The sample and 
weighting (MarketScan versus total population) varies across these regressions. Appendix Table 7 reports 2SLS 
estimates separately for respiratory and cardiovascular causes (Panel A), and for non-respiratory and non-
cardiovascular causes (Panel B). These 2SLS estimates by cause are somewhat less precise than the all-cause 
estimates in Table 5, though they still show that a substantial portion of the health consequences of NOx emissions 




leads to a 3 or an 0.46 percentage point increase in summertime deaths per 100,000 people, 
respectively.24  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to develop plausibly causal estimates 
of the relationships between NOx emissions with health and defensive investments.
25 Further if it 
is appropriate to interpret the IV ozone estimates as causal, they would substantially alter our 
understanding of the welfare consequence of exposure to ozone. For example, the most 
prominent ozone-mortality study (Bell et al. 2004) finds an elasticity of weekly ozone with 
respect to daily mortality rates that is smaller than the elasticity implied by Table 5.  
 
VII. Calculating Welfare Impacts 
This paper’s results allow us to conduct a simple cost-benefit analysis for the entire NBP, with 
the caveat that data restrictions prevent us from measuring all health outcomes and defensive 
expenditures. The estimates in Table 2 imply that the NBP market decreased NOx emissions by 
427,000 tons per summer on average and the average cost of a NOx permit was $2,523/ton.
26 The 
permit price should reflect an upper bound on abatement costs per ton, because firms should only 
use abatement technologies that cost less than the permit price. Thus, an upper bound estimate is 
that the market caused firms to spend $1,076 million (2015$) annually to abate NOx (Table 6, 
Column 4). Defining 2003 to have half a year of typical abatement costs, we obtain an upper 
bound on 2003-2007 total abatement costs of $4.8 billion (=1,076 x 4.5). 
We now turn to estimating the NBP’s social benefits. As we discussed above, it may 
seem natural to assume that a change in pharmaceutical purchases are simply a transfer from 
                                                 
24 The values in Table 5 all include the years 2001-2007. For mortality but not medications we can also estimate 
results including years 1997-2007, and obtain generally similar results. With this longer time period, the 2SLS 
estimate for the mortality effect of NOx emissions in all counties is 5.18 (3.50), or 2.67 (1.89) in counties with NOx 
emissions. The 2SLS estimates for 8-hour ozone and ozone days above 65 ppb are 1.61 (0.76) and 0.48 (0.23), 
respectively. 
25 Holland et al. (2016) apply the Muller-Mendelsohn model to simulate the consequences of emissions from 
Volkswagen vehicles. They do not estimate regressions directly linking observed NOx emissions to observed 
outcomes like health. 
26 The effect on NOx emissions is calculated by multiplying the estimated impact of NPB on NOx emissions (-0.36) 




consumers to pharmaceutical firms and thus have zero social cost. However, reductions in air 
pollution concentrations decrease the demand for medications that protect individuals from air 
pollution. Dynamically, this decline in demand will reduce the resources used to develop these 
medication types and will allow these resources to be applied to more productive uses. We are 
unaware of an empirically validated approach to socially valuing this reduction in drug purchases 
but believe that it is defensible to assume that it is valued at their full cost, especially over long 
time horizons; Table 6 adopts this assumption, and also reports the total change in copayments.  
Column (1) of Table 6 Panel B reports the average annual reduction in medication 
expenditures, as well as the sum over the NBP’s life. Specifically, we take the estimated 1.5% 
reduction in medication purchases from the regression result in column (3) and row 1 of Table 3 
and multiply that by the annual mean medication purchases. This calculation suggests that the 
NBP market led to a decrease in medication expenditures of $820 million per year or $3.7 billion 
when summed over the 4.5 years that the NBP operated. It is unclear whether this extrapolation 
from the MarketScan population under- or over-states the effect on the full population.  
The Table 4 mortality estimates imply that the market prevented about 2,200 deaths per 
summer. The value of a statistical life (VSL) determines the monetary value assigned to these 
deaths. To provide one approach to monetization, we use Ashenfelter and Greenstone’s (2004) 
upper bound VSL of $2.27 million (2015$) for a prime age person and Murphy and Topel’s 
(2006) method to develop estimates of the VSL for each age group in our analysis. This 
adjustment is especially consequential in this setting where the avoided fatalities are largely 
among individuals 75 and over. The implied VSLs are as follows: $2.3 million (infants), $1.78 
million (ages 1-64), $0.7 million (ages 65-74), and $0.3 million (ages 75+). The application of 
this approach implies that the value of the mortality avoided by the NBP is $1.1 billion per year, 
or $4.8 billion in the period 2003-2007 (Table 6 Panel B).27  
                                                 
27 We thank Kevin Murphy and Bob Topel for sharing the data underlying Figure 3 of their paper. The VSL used 
here is lower than the $8.7 million VSL ($2015) used by the EPA, which is not age-adjusted. Our primary goal is 




The entries in Panels A and B of Table 6 provide the basis for a comparison of the costs 
and benefits. The upper bound on the NBP’s aggregate abatement costs is $4.8 billion, but by 
themselves the value of the reduced medication purchases of $3.7 billion nearly equals these 
costs. At least in this context, defensive investments are economically important. Once the value 
of the reduced rates of mortality is added in, the benefits of the market are nearly twice as large 
as the upper-bound of its abatement costs (i.e., $8.5 billion in benefits and $4.8 billion in costs). 
Thus the NBP’s social benefits easily exceeded its abatement costs.  
We consider two alternatives to the benefit-cost analysis in column 5 Table 6. An 
alternative measure of medication costs is copayments. The log change in copayments is almost 
identical to the log change in total medication expenditures (see Appendix Table 2). Copayments 
represent 21 percent of the total payment for medications (Table 1). Total copayment savings per 
year are $150 million, or $676 million over the 2003-2007 NBP. A second alternative is to 
calculate the upper-bound on the NBP market cost using other measures of the NBP allowance 
price. An alternative estimate of market costs of $3,000 per ton implies an upper bound cost of 
$1.3 billion per year, or $5.8 billion total over the 2003-2007 period.28 Under both alternatives, 
medication costs represent an economically important proportion of the benefits and costs of the 
NBP market, and excluding medication expenditures (which are only one component of 
defensive investments) would substantially understate the market’s benefits. The magnitude of 
the understatement varies with these assumptions.  
                                                                                                                                                             
adjustment. Using the $8.7 million VSL rather than the $2.27 million VSL implies that the mortality benefits of 
NBP were larger: $5.3 billion per year or $23.9 billion for the 2003-2007 total. 
28 This value slightly exceeds the average allowance price in the years 2002-2006. When the market opened in May 
2003, allowance prices of different vintages ranged from $2250 to $5000 per ton. Prices of all vintages fell rapidly 
during the first year to below $3000. In the following years 2004-2006, allowance prices were fairly stable at 




Estimates of willingness to pay for reductions in NOx emissions have considerable policy 
relevance since NOx is the pollutant that policymakers can regulate directly, whereas ozone is 
only formed through complicated chemical reactions involving other pollutants. Table 6’s Panel 
C reports on estimated willingness to pay (WTP) for a reduction of one million tons of NOx 
emissions and its component parts.29 Based on estimates from counties with NOx emissions, each 
1 million ton decrease in summertime NOx emissions in the NBP states annually saves about 
$0.6 billion in medication expenditures and roughly 8,000 premature summertime deaths, with 
an estimated value of $3.9 billion in mortality benefits (Table 6, Panel C); the total WTP is thus 
about $4.5 billion. The alternative estimated WTP of $4.8 billion, based on estimates from the 
full sample of counties, is qualitatively identical. These figures are underestimates if other 
categories of well-being or defensive expenditures respond to changes in NOx emissions. 
Table 6 also reports estimates of willingness to pay for a reduction in ozone, but they 
must be interpreted cautiously due to uncertainty about the validity of the exclusion restriction.30 
The IV ozone results suggest that each 1 ppb decrease in the mean 8-hour summer ozone 
concentration in the NBP states is worth approximately $1.9 billion in social benefits annually. 
Similarly, one fewer day per summer in the NBP states with an ozone concentration exceeding 
65 ppb would yield roughly $600 million of benefits annually (Table 6, Panel D).  
 
VIII. Conclusions 
                                                 
29 The value in column (2) comes from multiplying together the IV estimates of the effect of NOx emissions on log 
medication costs (Table 5), the mean medication expenditure per person-season (Table 1), and the mean population 
in the NBP states in the years 2003-2007 (136 million). The value in column (2) comes from multiplying the IV 
estimates of the effects of NOx emissions on the mortality rate (Table 5) by the total population in the NBP states. 
The value in column (3) comes from by taking the mean willingness to pay per death prevented from Panel B of 
Table 6, and multiplying it by the change in number of deaths from column (2) of Table 6. 
30 The approach for calculating the ozone benefits in Panel D of Table 6 is similar to the methodology for 
calculating the NOx benefits in Panel C of Table 6, and is described above. It is worth noting that estimates of the 
benefits of the NBP, NOx emissions, and ozone for mortality and medications do not have identical samples since 




Theoretical models make clear that willingness to pay (WTP) for well-being in a variety of 
contexts is a function of factors that enter the utility function directly (e.g., the probability of 
mortality, school quality, etc.) and the costly investments that help to determine these factors. 
One approach to developing measures of WTP is to find a single market that captures 
individuals’ full valuation, as can be the case with property markets under some assumptions 
(see, e.g., Chay and Greenstone 2005; Greenstone and Gallagher 2008). All too frequently 
though, the data and/or a compelling research design for the key market outcomes are 
unavailable, making it necessary to develop measures of WTP by summing its components.  
However, across a wide variety of applied literatures, the empirical evidence on WTP has 
almost exclusively focused on the factors that enter the utility function directly. The resulting 
measures of willingness to pay are thus generally underestimated and the extent of this 
underestimation is unknown. This paper has demonstrated that defensive expenditures are an 
important part of willingness to pay for air quality. Indeed in the context of the NOx Budget 
Program, the improvement in air quality generates reductions in medication purchases that are 
close to an upper bound estimate of the abatement cost. A fruitful area for research is to explore 
whether individuals’ compensatory behavior and resulting defensive investments account for 
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Figure 1. Total Daily NOX Emissions in the NBP-Participating States 
 
Notes: Figure 1 shows average total daily NOx emissions in the NBP participating states in 2001-
02 and 2005-07. These estimates are obtained an OLS regression of NOx emissions on 6 day-of-
week indicators and a constant. The values in the graph equal the constant plus the regression 
residuals, so that the graph depicts fitted values for the reference category (Wednesday). Total 
daily NOx emissions on Y-axis are measured in thousands of tons. The sample includes 
emissions from all the Acid Rain Units. NBP participating states include: Alabama, Connecticut, 
Delaware, District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. The NBP operated only in Northeastern states 












Figure 2. NBP Market Impact on NOx Emissions and Ambient Ozone Pollution  
(A) Event Study for NOx Emissions, 1997-2007 
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Notes: The estimates in Figure 2 Panel (A) are from an event study regression for NOx emissions 
(measured in thousand of tons and observed at the county*year*season) where the estimates for 
year 2002 are restricted to have a value of 0. The regression includes detailed weather controls 
and a full set of county*year, season*year, and county*season fixed effects. The standard errors 
underlying the 95% confidence intervals (dashed lines) are clustered at the state-season level. In 
Panel (B), the bins represent to 6 categories of ozone 8-hour values, corresponding to the number 
of days per summer where the ozone 8-hour value is 0-20 ppb, 20-40 ppb, 40-60 ppb, etc. The 
ozone 8-hour value is measured as the maximum rolling 8-hour mean of hourly values within 
each day. The coefficients reported in Figure 2 Panel (B) are from a separate regression for each 
bin that includes detailed weather controls and a full set of county*year, season*year, and 
county*season fixed effects. The regression is weighted by the number of ozone readings in each 
county*season*year. The standard errors underlying the 95% confidence intervals (dashed lines) 
are clustered at the state-season level. The asterisk on the 80-100 category denotes the 







Figure 3. Impact of the NBP Market on Defensive Expenditures Health Outcomes 
 
(A) Event Study for Log Respiratory + Cardiovascular Medication Costs Per Capita 
($2015) 
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Notes: The estimates in Figure 3 Panel (A) are from an event study regression for log medication 
costs per capita (respiratory and cardiovascular medications only), and the estimates in Figure 3 
Panel (B) are from an event study regression for mortality rates per 100,000 population 
(respiratory and cardiovascular causes only). In both regressions, the estimates for year 2002 are 
restricted to have a value of 0. The regressions include detailed weather controls and a full set of 
county*year, season*year, and county*season fixed effects, and are weighted by county 
population (Panel (A) uses MarketScan population and Panel (B) uses total population). The 
standard errors underlying the 95% confidence intervals (dashed lines) are clustered at the state-






Table 1. Mean Summer Values of the Pollution, Weather, and Health Variables, 2001-2007 
 
Notes: Medication and hospitalization costs are reported in 2015 dollars and deflated using the US CPI 
for urban consumers. Emissions, medications, and deaths are totals per summer. Ambient pollution and 






Pollution Emissions (000's of Tons/Summer)
  NOx Emissions 2,539 0.52 (1.99)
  SO2 Emissions 2,539 1.50 (6.52)
  CO2 Emissions 2,539 384 (1,299)
Air Quality (Ambient Pollution) 
  Ozone 8-Hour Value (ppb) 168 48.06 (9.28)
  Ozone Days ≥65 (ppb) 168 23.60 (22.64)
  NO2 (ppb) 110 11.45 (5.39)
  CO (ppm) 125 0.44 (0.24)
  PM2.5 (μg/m
3
) 298 13.33 (4.19)
  PM10 (μg/m
3
) 39 27.28 (6.26)
  SO2 (ppb) 150 3.26 (2.27)
Weather
  Temperature (ºF) 2,539 70.59 (5.79)
  Precipitation (1/100") 2,539 11.46 (5.37)
  Dew Point Temp. (ºF) 2,539 57.77 (7.91)
Medication Costs ($ Per Person)
  All 2,435 377.56 (338.66)
  Copayment 2,435 79.10 (59.21)
  Respiratory or Cardio. 2,435 122.67 (131.87)
Hospitalizations ($ Per Person)
  All 2,435 593.93 (2,501.71)
  Respiratory or Cardio. 2,435 120.57 (923.57)
Mortality (Deaths Per 100,000 People)
  All 2,539 402.42 (121.32)




Table 2. Effect of the NBP Market on Emitted and Ambient Pollution 
 
Notes:. The entries in Table 2 are the coefficient estimates from the DDD estimator described in equation (7). Each 
coefficient is from a separate regression that includes a full set of county*year, season*year, and county*season 
fixed effects. Additional control variables  are listed in the text. The reported standard errors are clustered at the 
state-season level. Emitted pollutant variables (Panel A) are measured in thousand of tons and ambient pollutant 
variables (Panel B) are mean values. Unless otherwise noted, the sample period begins in 1997. Ambient pollution 
regressions (Panel B) are GLS weighted by square root of number of underlying pollution readings unless otherwise 
noted. For emissions, the number of observations is 55,858 for emissions in columns (1) to (3) and 35,546 for 
column (4). For ambient pollution, the number of observations for each pollutant based on 1997-2007 sample (2001-
2007 sample for PM) is 3,124 (Ozone); 2,244 (CO); 4,172 (PM2.5); 546 (PM10); 2,684 (SO2); 1,782 (NO2). Asterisks 
denote p-value < 0.10 (*), <0.05 (**), <0.01 (***). For emissions, share of population covered is 100%. For ambient 
pollution, share of population covered is 28-40 percent for ozone, CO, SO2, and NO2; 55 percent for PM2.5, and 10 
percent for PM10. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Pollution Emissions (000's of Tons per Summer)
1. NOx -0.36*** -0.37*** -0.36*** -0.33*** -0.43***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11)
  
2. SO2 -0.08** -0.12* -0.07 -0.07** -0.05
(0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.03) (0.13)
3. CO2 -2.66 -20.57 -4.04 -12.43* -79.96
(4.33) (15.87) (5.89) (6.59) (56.94)
B. Air Quality (Ambient Pollution)
4. Ozone 8-Hour Value (ppb) -2.91*** -3.74*** -2.76*** -3.06*** -3.15***
(0.77) (1.20) (0.73) (0.50) (0.49)
5. Ozone Days ≥ 65 (ppb) -7.40*** -8.53*** -7.96** -8.95*** -9.64***
(2.50) (2.76) (3.03) (2.61) (2.32)
6. CO: Carbon Monoxide (ppm) -0.05** -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
7. SO2: Sulfur Dioxide (ppb) 0.16 0.34 0.14 0.13 0.13
(0.12) (0.24) (0.20) (0.18) (0.14)
8. NO2: Nitrogen Dioxide (ppb) -1.13*** -0.92 -1.09*** -0.92** -1.23**
(0.21) (0.75) (0.35) (0.35) (0.49)
9. PM2.5: Particulates Less than 2.5 Micrometers --- --- --- -0.31 -0.93***
       (μg/m3) --- --- --- (0.31) (0.27)
10. PM10: Particulates Less than 10 Micrometers --- --- --- -1.18 -0.82
       (μg/m3) --- --- --- (0.87) (1.05)
County-by-Season FE x x x x x
Summer-by-Year FE x x x x x
State-by-Year FE x x
County-by-Year FE x x x
Detailed Weather Controls x x x x
Data Begins in 2001 x x
Weighted by Emission/Pollution Monitors (B. only) x x x x




Table 3. Effect of the NBP Market on Log Medication Costs Per Capita 
 
Notes: Medication costs are reported in 2015 dollars and deflated using the US CPI for urban consumers. 
The entries in Table 3 are the coefficient estimates from the DDD estimator described in equation (7) 
when the dependent variable is the log of medication costs per person-season-year in a county. Each 
coefficient is from a separate regression that includes a full set of county*year, season*year, and 
county*season fixed effects. Additional control variables  are listed in the bottom of Table 3. The reported 
standard errors are clustered at the state-season level. The regressions are GLS weighted by the square 
root of MarketScan population in a given county-year-season. The reported standard errors are clustered 
at the state-season level Total population refers to the 2,539 counties in the main sample. Asterisks denote 
p-value < 0.10 (*), <0.05 (**), <0.01 (***). Number of observations is as follows: Row 1 columns (1) to 
(3): 30,926. Row 1 column (4): 2,338. Row 2 columns (1) to (3): 28,784. Row 2 column (4): 2,324. Row 
3 columns (1) to (3): 24,080. Row 3 column (4): 2,296. 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. All Medications
1. All Medications -0.008 -0.023 -0.015** -0.016***
(0.010) (0.020) (0.006) (0.006)
    MarketScan as Share of Total Population 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.002
    Counties as Share of Total Population 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.370
B. Specific Types of Medications
2. Respiratory or Cardiovascular -0.009 -0.022 -0.021*** -0.017*
(0.013) (0.023) (0.008) (0.010)
3. Non-Respiratory and Non-Cardiovascular -0.009 -0.025 -0.014** -0.017**
(0.010) (0.020) (0.006) (0.008)
County-by-Season FE x x x x
Summer-by-Year FE x x x x
State-by-Year FE x x
County-by-Year FE x x
Detailed Weather Controls x x x
Only Counties With Ozone Monitors x




Table 4. Effect of the NBP Emissions Market on Mortality Rates 
 
Notes: The entries in Table 4 are the coefficient estimates from the DDD estimator described in equation 
(7) where the dependent variable is deaths per 100,000 population in each county-year-season. Each 
coefficient is from a separate regression that includes a full set of county*year, season*year, and 
county*season fixed effects. Additional control variables  are listed in the bottom of Table 4. The reported 
standard errors are clustered at the state-season level. The regressions are GLS weighted by the square 
root of the relevant population in a given county-year-season. Unless noted otherwise, the data begins in 
1997. Asterisks denote p-value < 0.10 (*), <0.05 (**), <0.01 (***). Asterisks denote p-value < 0.10 (*), 
<0.05 (**), <0.01 (***). Number of observations is 55,858 for columns (1) to (3); 3,124 for column (4); 
and 35,546 for column (5). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A: All Deaths
1. All Deaths -2.15** -2.09 -1.47* -5.34*** -2.24
(0.94) (3.54) (0.81) (1.82) (1.46)
B: Specific Causes of Death
2. Respiratory or Cardiovascular -0.75 -1.20 -0.47 -2.27* -0.84
(0.49) (1.79) (0.67) (1.17) (1.03)
3. Non-Respiratory and Non-Cardio. -1.40** -0.89 -1.00** -3.08*** -1.40*
(0.57) (1.92) (0.50) (0.84) (0.82)
4. External 0.57** -0.02 0.32 0.28 0.37
(0.23) (0.50) (0.33) (0.60) (0.44)
C. All Causes of Death, by Age Group
5. Age 0 (Infants) -2.26 -8.85 -4.24 3.63 -11.07
(3.90) (7.30) (6.14) (9.99) (9.73)
    Estimated Change in 2005 Deaths -39 -152 -73 63 -191
6. Ages 1-64 -0.09 -1.46 -0.13 -0.37 -0.57
(0.32) (1.07) (0.47) (1.14) (0.84)
    Estimated Change in 2005 Deaths -105 -1,701 -151 -431 -664
7. Ages 65-74 -1.85 -15.41 -2.25 -9.58 -1.23
(4.96) (11.79) (6.16) (10.43) (6.11)
    Estimated Change in 2005 Deaths -165 -1,373 -200 -853 -110
8. Ages 75+ -39.31*** -40.32* -18.63* -90.91*** -23.40
(8.38) (20.51) (10.68) (23.00) (17.93)
    Estimated Change in 2005 Deaths -3,367 -3,572 -1,813 -7,912 -2,507
County-by-Season FE x x x x x
Summer-by-Year FE x x x x x
State-by-Year FE x x
County-by-Year FE x x x
Detailed Weather Controls x x x x
Counties With Ozone Monitors x




Table 5. Effect of NOx Emissions and Ambient Ozone Concentrations On Medication 
Purchases and Mortality: Ordinary Least Squares and Instrumental Variables Estimates, 
2001-2007 
 
Notes: The coefficient estimates in columns (1), (2a), and (2b) are multiplied by 1000 for readability. All 
estimates are based on the 2001-2007 sample. NOx emissions are measured in thousand tons per county. 
All regressions include county*year, season*year, and county*season fixed effects, as well as the detailed 
weather controls. The regressions are GLS weighted by the square root of the relevant population in a 
given county-year-season (MarketScan or full population). In Panel B, the endogenous variable is NOx or 
ozone and the excluded instrument is Summer*Post*NBP interaction (see equation 9). Number of 
observations is 30,926 for medication regressions including all counties, 7,616 for medication regressions 
including counties with NOx emissions, 2,338 for medication regressions including only counties with 
ozone monitors, 35,546 for mortality regressions including all counties, 7,840 for mortality regressions 
including counties with NOx emissions, and 2,352 for mortality regressions only including counties with 
ozone monitors. The sample is smaller for medications than for mortality due to counties without no 














(1) (2a) (2b) (3) (4a) (4b)
A: OLS
NOx Emissions 0.07 0.40 --- -0.71* -0.76* ---
(1.13) (1.09) --- (0.39) (0.39) ---
8-Hour Ozone --- --- 0.72 --- --- 0.12
--- --- (1.00) --- --- (0.22)
Days ≥65 ppb --- --- 0.22 --- --- 0.01
--- --- (0.19) --- --- (0.05)
B: 2SLS
NOx Emissions 21.20 12.01** --- 5.16 5.35* ---
(13.77) (5.78) --- (3.85) (2.99) ---
8-Hour Ozone --- --- 6.23** --- --- 2.62**
--- --- (2.33) --- --- (1.28)
Days ≥65 ppb --- --- 1.69** --- --- 0.86*
--- --- (0.72) --- --- (0.49)
Log Medication Costs All-Cause Mortality
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Table 6. The Welfare Impacts of the NBP and the Social Benefits of NOx and Ozone Reductions 
 
Notes: All dollar amounts are in 2015 constant dollars deflated using BLS CPI for urban consumers. The mortality impact estimates without dollar 
signs are number of deaths. The monetized mortality impact uses the VSL of $2.27 million (2015 dollars) from Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004) 
and the age adjustments from Murphy and Topel (2006, p. 888). The implied VSLs are as follows: $2.26 million (infants); $1.78 million (age 1-
64); $0.7 million (age 65-74); $0.3 million (age 75+). Total 2003-7 decrease due to NBP assumes impact is for half of 2003 summer and for all of 
summers 2004-2007. NBP cost upper bound is based on the permit price of about $2,523/ton ($2015) and estimated total abatement quantity of 
427,000 tons. The numbers in Panel A comes from multiplying together the mean NBP allowance price per ton, the effect of the NBP on county-
level NOx emissions (Table 2, column 4), and the number of counties in the NBP states (1,185). The numbers in Panels B-D come from 
multiplying together regression estimates of how the NBP, NOx, or ozone affects medication costs or mortality by the total number of people in the 
NBP states, averaged over 2003-2007 (136 million people). Specifically, Panel B, column (1), uses the estimate from Table 3, column (3). Panel 
B, columns (2)-(3) use the estimates from Table 4, column (3), Panel C. Panel C, column (1) uses the estimate from Table 5, column (1), Panel B. 
Panel C, columns (2)-(3) use the estimate from Table 5, Panel B, column (3). Panel D, column (1) uses the estimate from Table 5, Panel B, column 
(2). Panel D, columns (2)-(3) use the estimate from Table 5, Panel B, column (4). Panel D estimates are based on regressions using counties with 
ozone monitors. All estimates apply to the full population in NBP states. See the text for further details. 
Number of 
Deaths
Monetized Value  
($ Million)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
   Upper Bound Per Year --- --- --- --- $1,076 $1,076
   Upper Bound, 2003-2007 Total --- --- --- --- $4,843 $4,843
B. Estimates of the NBP's Benefits
    Total Per Year $820 $150 2,238 $1,068 $1,888 $1,219
    Total 2003-2007 $3,690 $676 10,069 $4,807 $8,497 $5,483
C. The Annual Social Benefits of NOx Reductions in NBP states (Million Tons)
Regressions Based on . . . 
    All Counties $1,086 $211 7,791 $3,720 $4,806 $3,931
    Counties with NOx Emissions $615 $121 8,117 $3,875 $4,491 $3,996
D. The Social Benefits of Ozone Reductions in NBP States (ppb)
     1 ppb Ozone Decrease $319 $47 3,326 $1,588 $1,907 $1,635
     1 Less Day With Ozone > 65 ppb $87 $13 1,072 $512 $599 $525
A. An Upper Bound Estimate of NBP's Social Costs
Medication 
Copayments      
($ Million)
Total Using 
(2)          
($ Million)
Mortality: Total Using 
(1)         
($ Million)
Medication 




ONLINE APPENDIX FOR: 
 
Defensive Investments and the Demand for Air Quality: 




University of California, Santa Barbara, and NBER 
 
Michael Greenstone 
University of Chicago and NBER 
 
Joseph S. Shapiro 





















Appendix I: The NOx Budget Trading Program and Particulate Matter 
 
This appendix provides one explanation based in atmospheric chemistry as to why the NOx 
Budget Trading Program might have limited effects on particulate matter. We begin by defining 
the relevant compounds: 
 
PM10 and PM2.5: particulate matter 
NOx: nitrogen oxides 
NO: nitric oxide, a component of NOx 
NO2: nitrogen dioxide, a component of NOx 
NH4NO3: ammonium nitrate, the component of PM2.5 and PM10 which NOx can form 
NO3: nitrate, a derivative of NOx 
NH4: ammonium 
SO4: sulfate, formed as a byproduct of electricity generation 
NH4e: excess ammonium, i.e., ammonium which remains after NH4 has bonded with SO4 
NH3: ammonia 
HNO3: nitric acid, a derivative of NOx 
 
A summary is that excess ammonium (NH4e) is the necessary ingredient for nitrate (NO3) to 
become ammonium nitrate (NH4NO3), which is a component of particulates. In the absence of 
NH4e, NOx and NO3 do not form particulate matter. NH4e levels were low in the Eastern U.S. 
during the operation of the NOx Budget Trading Program because levels of sulfate (SO4) were 
high enough to absorb much of the available NH4, so that little sulfate remained to bond with 
nitrate.  
 
A more detailed explanation follows. For NOx to become a component of PM10 or PM2.5, NOx 
must decompose to nitrate (NO3). Nitrate then must undergo a reaction with excess ammonium 
(NH4e) to form ammonium nitrate (NH4NO3). Ammonium nitrate is a component of particulate 
matter but nitrate is not. So a necessary condition for NOx to increase particulate matter is the 
presence of sufficient excess ammonium to convert nitrate into ammonium nitrate.  
 
To assess the empirical relevance of this explanation, we calibrated an air quality model 
(CRDM) using the 2002 National Emissions Inventory, as in Muller and Mendelsohn (2012). 
According to calculations from CRDM, the Eastern U.S. had relatively low levels of NH4e during 
the operation of the NOx Budget Trading Program. Excess ammonium levels were low in part 
because NH4 preferentially bonds with SO4, which is a byproduct of sulfur emissions. Even with 
the Acid Rain program, sulfur levels were high enough in the Eastern U.S. in 2003-2007 that 
little NH4 remained as NH4e after the NH4-SO4 reaction occurred. 
 
According to calculations using CRDM, in the period 2003-2007, the Eastern U.S. had relatively 
low levels of excess ammonium, which could explain why we fail to find consistent evidence 
consistently that the NOx Budget Program affected particulate levels. Pandis and Seinfeld (2006), 
a widely-cited atmospheric chemistry text, note that this phenomenon is well-established: 
 
“The formation of ammonium nitrate is often limited by the availability of one of the 
reactants. Figure 10.24 shows the ammonium concentration as a function of the total 
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available ammonia and the total available nitric acid for a polluted area. The upper left 
part of the figure (area A) is characterized by relatively high total nitric acid 
concentrations and relatively low ammonia. Large urban areas are often in this regime. 
The isopleths are almost parallel to the y-axis in this area, so decreases in nitric acid 





Appendix II: Medications as Defensive Investments 
 
It is worth considering the extent to which medication purchases studied in this paper should be 
defined as defensive, rather than just another health expenditure. We argue that whether the 
drugs are taken before or after health conditions manifest themselves, the important issue is that 
drugs aim to mitigate a negative health condition in both instances. Indeed, a recent New 
England Journal of Medicine article underscores that the key to treating asthma is limiting 
exposure to ambient concentrations of air pollution and consumption of pharmaceuticals:  
 
Achieving good long-term control of asthma (infrequent asthmatic symptoms, an 
unrestricted level of activity, normal or near-normal lung function, and rare 
asthmatic attacks requiring emergency care) requires a multifaceted approach: 
avoidance of environmental stimuli that can provoke bronchoconstriction and acute 
and chronic airway inflammation . . . and [emphasis added] drug therapy (Fanta 
2009, p. 1005).  
 
Further there has been a substantial decline in asthma mortality and emergency department visits 
since the 1970s and 1980s, even as the incidence of asthma increased; a leading explanation is 
the more widespread use of asthma medications, specifically inhaled corticosteroids (Fanta 
2009). The point is that these drugs reduce the incidence of negative health outcomes and that 
the failure to account for expenditures on them in the previous literature has led to downward 
biased measures of willingness to pay for ozone reductions. 
 
Additionally, we believe the theoretical economics literature supports the interpretation of the 
medication results. Specifically in the canonical model of health production function (see e.g., 
the recent JEL review by Graff-Zivin and Neidell 2013), individual compensatory responses to 
ambient pollution levels are typically decomposed into averting activities (aimed at reducing the 
amount of ingested pollution) and mitigating activities (aimed at reducing the negative effect of 
ingested pollution), with the latter including healthcare costs and medication purchases. In this 
framework, it is clear from the model structure that medication purchases are a defensive 
measure, not an outcome. 
 
While these arguments suggest that all medications are defensive, we do provide one estimate 
which distinguishes respiratory medications (which are taken after respiratory symptoms appear) 
from long-term control medications, which are taken regularly in order to prevent the appearance 
of symptoms. Using National Drug Codes, we attempted to distinguish “maintenance” 
respiratory medications that are taken every day or week to treat chronic respiratory conditions, 
from “rescue” respiratory medications that are taken once acute respiratory symptoms appear. 
We distinguish these medications using lists from Fanta (2009) of which respiratory medications 
are short-acting (i.e., rescue) versus long-acting (i.e., control). We also list a set of results which 
restricts regressions to mail-order purchases, since these are more likely to be focused on long-
term control medications. We find evidence that the NBP decreased purchases of both short-
acting and long-term control medications (Appendix Table 2). The point estimates for the overall 
sample indicate that the NBP decreased purchase of short-acting medications by 2.4 percentage 
points and decreased purchase of long-term control medications by 2.1 percentage points; only 
the long-term control estimate is statistically significant. The estimated coefficients are slightly 
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larger though less precise in the subset of counties with ozone monitors. Our estimates for mail-
order purchases are similar to the overall estimates of NBP decreasing expenditure by about 1.5 





Appendix III: Data and Methodology Details 
 
This appendix provides additional information on the study sample construction and the 




The main medication variable is the log of medication purchases per person. Because not all 
persons purchase medications, we count the number of individuals eligible to purchase 
medications from the enrollment files. We only count individuals who have a variable indicating 
that they recorded drug purchases, though this covers essentially all individuals in the firms and 
years we study. When the enrollment file has a missing value for an individual’s county, we fill 
it with the county which is reported for that available in the nearest available lag; or if no lagged 
months have a reported county, then we fill it with the closest-available lead. We use the first 




The MarketScan data report the purchase county, date, the medication’s National Drug Code 
(NDC), and the money paid from consumer and insurer to the medication provider. 2007 is the 
last year of the MarketScan dataset available for this analysis, so that is the last year of data for 
the analysis. Reported medication payments vary substantially across individuals and include 
some negative values. To address measurement error in medication payments, we measure the 
mean medication payment for each National Drug Code. This calculation uses all positive 
recorded medication payments for observations in the main regression sample. The dependent 
variable in main regressions is the log of this mean price. We deflate all currency to real year 
2015 values using the BLS CPI for urban consumers. Medication purchases are assigned to the 
county where they are recorded. We include only medication purchases from individuals 
recorded in the enrollment files as working for one of the firms in the sample. While the main 
analysis includes individuals in a balanced panel of 19 firms, sensitivity analyses in Appendix 
Tables 2 and 4 report estimates from a balanced panel of about 600,000 persons in these firms. 
For confidentiality reasons MarketScan does not identify the 19 firms. These tables also report a 
sensitivity analysis using the 11 firms which appear in all the years 2000-2007.  
 
It is worth noting that the medication expenditure estimates reported in Table 6 potentially suffer 
from re-transformation bias since the regression models are log-linear in expenditures, but Table 
6 reports untransformed expenditures. When we apply the “smearing” estimator of Duan (1983) 
that corrects for re-transformation bias we obtain essentially the same estimates as the unadjusted 
ones in Table 6. 
 
As discussed in the main text, the medication estimates are representative of Americans 
employed in large firms and their dependents, who appear in the MarketScan data; these people 
may have better baseline health than the average American, but may also have better health 
insurance and hence spend more on medications than the average American. Appendix Table 6 
compares the characteristics of individuals in the MarketScan database with individuals in the 
January 2003 Current Population Survey (CPS) and the year 2000 Census. Compared to CPS 
respondents, MarketScan workers are about 11 percentage points more likely to be in a union, 7 
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percentage points more likely to receive a salary (rather than working for hourly wages), and 5 
percentage points more likely to be full-time (rather than part-time). Heavy industry sectors are 
heavily over-represented in MarketScan, relative to workers in the CPS, while the retail, finance, 
insurance, real estate, and services are substantially under-represented in MarketScan. The age 
distribution of MarketScan individuals is similar to the overall age distribution in the year 2000 




As mentioned in the main text, we classify hospitalizations according to the mode procedure for 
each visit. MarketScan codes the primary diagnosis for each service provided in a hospitalization 
episode. Patients admitted to the hospital typically receive numerous services, some of which 




We compiled weather data from records of the National Climate Data Center Summary of the 
Day files (File TD-3200). The key control variables for our analysis are the daily maximum and 
minimum temperature, total daily precipitation, and dew point temperature. In order to ensure 
accurate weather readings, and complete county-day data files, we construct our weather 
variables for a given year from the readings of all weather stations that report valid readings for 
every day in that year. The acceptable station-level data is then aggregated at the county level by 
taking an inverse-distance weighted average of all the valid measurements from stations that are 
located within a 200 km radius of each county’s centroid, where the weights are the inverse of 
their squared distance to the centroid so that more distant stations are given less weight. This 
results in complete weather by county-day files that we can link with the other files in our 
analysis. 
 
Dew point temperature values are limited in the raw data. To address missing values, we impute 
them by regressing observed county-day dew point temperature on mean temperature, mean 
precipitation, year fixed effects, county fixed effects, a quartic polynomial in day-of-year, and 
interactions of the quartic polynomial separately with each of the following three variables: daily 
mean precipitation, daily mean temperature and precipitation*temperature. The regression uses 




We assign each ton of emitted pollution to the county where the emitting source is located. 
Counties with no recorded emissions are assigned emissions of zero. We use this approach 
because we observe all NBP-regulated pollution emissions and the information on their emitting 
source, so we record them as such without any kind of spatial averaging needed. 
 
                                                 
1 Given the large sample sizes and differences in means, hypothesis tests reject equality of these characteristics 




We convert pollution units using values from Spellman and Whiting (2005). For each pollutant, 
we calculate ambient levels in each monitor-day, then the unweighted average across monitors in 
each county-day, and finally aggregate up to county-season. All ambient pollution regressions 
are GLS based on the square root of the total number of underlying pollution readings. 
 
The abrupt beginning and end of the market on May 1 and October 1 makes a daily regression 
discontinuity estimator seem appealing. However, because ozone in the Eastern US mainly 
reaches high levels in July and August, the market is likely to have small effects on ambient 
pollution on April 30 or October 1. Although emitted pollution changed sharply around these 
dates (Figure 1), we detect no change in mean daily ambient pollution in small windows around 
these dates. 
 
We did explore statistical models that separately estimate effects of the market on pollution (and 
health) outcomes in each month of summer. These specifications did not have statistical power to 
distinguish effects in different months of summer, and hence we focus on results that treat 
summer as homogenous. Modeling the market’s impact on summer overall, rather than month-
by-month, also produces medium-term estimates of the market’s impact. This makes the results 
less susceptible to the concern that changes in air quality cause short-term displacement of 




The instrumental variables estimates including all counties are computationally demanding given 
the three sets of fixed effects (county*year, county*season, season*year) and approximately 
2,500 counties in the data. We implement these estimators using efficient optimization routines 
(Guimaraes and Portugal 2010). In smaller samples, these routines obtain numerically equivalent 
point estimates to those of conventional methods. The estimated confidence regions may be 
slightly conservative, since in these smaller samples they obtain standards errors that are a few 
percent larger than those estimated with conventional methods. 
 
The fact that our counterfactual allows other changes such as NOx regulations to be operating in 
the background can be seen from Appendix Figure 2. In both seasons and regions of the country, 
NOx emissions were declining even before the NBP began, and for 2000-2002 the pre-trends 
were similar in both regions and seasons. The counterfactual analyzed here is if summertime 
NOx emissions in the Eastern U.S. continued along the pre-trends observed before 2002, but did 





Appendix IV: Additional Details about the NOx Budget Trading Program 
 
This Appendix describes additional details about the NOx Budget Trading Program (NBP) not 
explained in the main text. 
 
Our research design is based on comparing emissions in summer versus winter months. Because 
NOx abatement technologies have substantial operating costs (Fowlie 2010), units begin 
operating them around May 1 and stop around September 30. Part of the operating cost comes 
from the “heat rate penalty” of selective catalytic reduction—the fact that they require a small 
amount of electricity to operate. 
 
The NBP grew out of the Ozone Transport Commission (OTC), an organization of Northeast 
States formed in the 1990s. OTC studies found that ozone levels the Northeast U.S. had high 
ozone partly because prevailing winds transported NOx from the industrial Midwest to the 
Northeast, where it produced ozone in the Northeast (OTC 1998). The OTC led to a version of 
the NBP that operated in 1999-2002 and produced small declines in summer NOx emissions.2 
The OTC then created a more stringent version of the NBP which began in 2003 and operated 
until 2008.3  
 
As described in the main text, the NBP included 19 states plus DC. Georgia was initially slated 
to enter the market in 2007 but the EPA eventually chose to exclude Georgia.  
 
Policymakers included some provisions to help smooth the start of the market. Regulators 
provided an additional set of initial allowances in 2003-2004 known as the Compliance 
Supplement Pool or CSP to help states begin compliance with the market without threatening 
electricity supply reliability. Ultimately many of these allowances were banked to future years. 
Unused allowances from the NBP could be transferred to the CAIR ozone season program which 
succeeded the NBP after 2008. 
 
In 2002, summertime emissions from sources participating in this market totaled approximately 
1 million tons, with a significant downward pre-trend that had similar magnitude in both the East 
and West (Appendix Figure 2). Compared to the level of NOx emissions in 2002, the final cap of 
550,000 tons would have decreased emissions by 45%. As discussion of our results later in the 
paper shows, however, accounting for the pre-trend and the fact that emitters banked allowances 
                                                 
2 This market also goes under the name NOx SIP Call. This smaller market also operated in May-September. The 
OTC market aimed to decrease summer NOx emissions by 76,000 tons (OTC 2003). NOx emissions from regulated 
NBP units in our data fell by 504,000 tons between 2002 and 2005, or about 6.6 times more than the OTC market. 
While in principle this earlier market could be a source of confounding variation for the pollution and mortality 
regressions which begin in 1997, those regressions have similar signs and significance as the pollution and mortality 
regressions beginning in 2001. The OTC market cap for most states did not change between 2000 and 2002, so this 
is not a potential source of confounding variation for our pre-period in those years. The only small change in the 
OTC market in these years is that some pollution sources in Maryland and DC entered the market in those years, and 
the cap in those states modestly increased to accommodate them (OTC 2003).  
3 2007 is the last year of the MarketScan dataset available for this analysis, so that is the last year of data for the 
analysis. In 2009, the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) replaced this market. In 2010, the EPA proposed a Transport 
Rule which would combine this NOx market with a market for SO2 emissions. In July 2011, the EPA replaced this 
proposal with the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, which regulates power plant emissions in 27 states with the goal of 
decreasing ambient ozone and particulate levels.  
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across years shows that the causal impact of the market was to decrease emissions by only 35-39 
percent. 
 
One important question involves the geographic scope of the NBP’s effects, and of our analysis. 
As discussed in the main text, the main analysis excludes states adjacent to the NBP region from 
the main results because their treatment status is ambiguous, though sensitivity analyses consider 
alternatives. The main analysis excludes Wisconsin, Iowa, Missouri, Georgia, Mississippi, 
Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont. We do not exclude Arkansas or Florida because they 
share only small sections of border with the NBP area and because prevailing winds blow to the 
Northeast, away from these states. We exclude Maine even though it does not share a border 
with the NBP region because it is downwind and close to many NBP states. We define Alabama 
as an NBP state even though the southern region of the state did not participate in the market.  
 
These exclusions have a basis in prevailing wind patterns and directions. On the 96 percent of 
days in the NBP region where windspeeds are below 6 meters per second, ozone and its 
precursors travel less than 300 miles (Husar and Renard 1997). This implies that on many days, 
emissions from the NBP region affect the states we exclude, but do not affect the states we 
include in the comparison group. Husar and Renard (1997) find that ozone and precursors travel 
up to 120 miles on days with windspeeds below 3 m/s and up to 300 miles on days with 
windspeeds below 6 m/s. We obtained raw windspeed readings from the National Climate Data 
Center’s Summary of the Day – First Order (DSI-3210) files and measured average windspeed 
and directions across states for all states in the NBP region. Mean windspeeds are below 3 m/s 
on 61 percent of days and are 3-6 m/s on 34 percent of days. Although prevailing winds blow to 
the East, on many days wind blows in other directions. On 27 percent of days wind primarily 
blows to the north, on 35 percent of days it primarily blows to the East, on 21 percent to the 
South, and on 17 percent to the West.  
 
Another interesting question is the extent to which any changes in NOx or other pollution 
emissions occurred due to fuel conversion of units, for example from coal to natural gas. This is 
ambiguous from participation data available from the EPA’s Air Markets Program Data, though 
the data do rule out large-scale closure of coal units. The number of coal units in the NBP 
actually grew from 845 in 2003 to 856 in 2008. At the same time, the number of gas units grew 
from 1,168 to 1,305 and the number of oil units fell from 471 to 463. So the absolute number of 
coal units rose, while the proportion of NBP units that are coal fell by 1.5 percentage points. 
Qualitatively similar patterns occur within the subset of NBP units that are owned by electric 
utilities, and within the subset that are industrial boilers. These statistics ignore the 1% of units 
that report multiple primary fuels. 
 
We also explored whether the NOx reductions produced any counterproductive outcomes, with 
mixed results. When an area has low concentrations of volatile organic compounds relative to 
NOx, then decreasing NOx can increase ozone levels. First, we identify a list of such “VOC-
constrained” cities from Blanchard (2001). Second, we define a county as VOC-constrained if its 
mean ratio of weekend/weekday ozone exceeds 1.05. The former approach finds that the change 
in ozone concentrations is similar in VOC-constrained and -unconstrained regions. The latter 
indicates that in VOC-constrained regions of the NBP, the decline in ozone was smaller than in 




While Figure 2 (A) shows the regression-adjusted event study graph of NOx emissions, 
Appendix Figure 2 shows the raw emissions trends separately by season and year. Appendix 
Figure 2 (A) shows that the NBP led to sharp and discontinuous reductions in summer emissions 
in the Eastern U.S., starting in 2003 when the market began in 8 Northeastern states and 
Washington, DC. Emissions declined another 15-20 percent starting in May 2004, when the 
market added 11 more Eastern states. Winter emissions in the Eastern U.S. continued their 
gradual downward pre-2003 trend. In contrast, Appendix Figure 2 (B) reveals that summer and 
winter NOx emissions in the non-NBP states evolved smoothly over time, with similar downward 
trends and no evidence of any discernible trend change in 2003 and 2004, when the NBP was 
implemented. In short, this Appendix Figure shows that NOx emissions declined in exactly the 






Appendix V: Additional Sensitivity Analyses 
 
All of the ambient and emitted pollution results are further evaluated and probed in Appendix 
Table 1, which considers a wide range of specifications, including changes in the method used to 
compute the standard errors and alternative sample selection rules. In addition, we estimated 
models that also allowed for differential pre-existing trends in the NBP states during the summer. 
In general, the models fail to reject the null of no difference in pre-existing trends and cause the 
standard error on the parameter of interest, γ1, to increase by a factor of 2 to 3. The only 
substantive change is that the impact on ozone concentrations is larger in magnitude although the 
95% confidence intervals of the estimates from specifications with and without the differential 
trends overlap.  
 
Appendix Table 2 reports medication results from a series of robustness checks, none of which 
alter the qualitative conclusions from Table 3. For example, Row 12 shows that defining the 
dependent variable as the log of copayments per person rather than as the log of mean 
medication costs per person results in a decrease in medication costs per person of 1.4 percent, as 
opposed to the 1.5 percent effect in the main sample. Estimates for the subsample of young 
children are very imprecise due in part to the smaller sample of children.  
 
Row 2 considers the non-NBP states excluded from the main analysis sample since they border 
NBP states and are expected to benefit to due wind transmission of pollution. This group 
includes Wisconsin, Iowa, Missouri, Georgia, Mississippi, Maine, New Hampshire, and 
Vermont. Our results are similar when we reassign these states to the NBP. 
 
Appendix Table 4 discusses similar sensitivity analyses for the effect of the NBP on mortality. 
The qualitative conclusions are similar under these alternative estimates.  
 
Appendix Table 5, column (1) explores heterogeneity in the magnitude of the NBP’s effect on 
ambient ozone across different sub-parts of the NBP. Ten northeastern states entered the NBP 
market in 2003 whereas other states began in 2004 (the delay was due to litigation). Also 
because prevailing winds blow to the Northeast, they might experience larger effects of 
emissions decreases in the industrial Midwest. The NBP decreased ozone in these states by an 
additional 2 ppb, decreased medication expenditures in these states by an additional 3.8 
percentage points. The NBP caused a larger decline in ozone for the ten northeastern states 
which entered the market in 2003, which is unsurprising since these states entered the market a 
year earlier than other states did and since prevailing winds blow to the northeast. The NBP also 
caused a larger decline in ozone for counties which had relatively high ozone in 2002, which fits 










Appendix Figure 1. Participation in NBP by State 
 
 
Notes: Dark blue states are participating in NBP during the 2003-2007 period (referred as ‘NBP states’ in 
the text). Light blue states are not participating (non-NBP states). Shaded states are excluded from the 




Appendix Figure 2. Summer-Equivalent Seasonal NOx Emissions (Mil. Tons) 
 
(A) States Participating in NBP 
 
 
(B) States Not Participating in NBP 
 
Notes: The data underlying Appendix Figure 2 is expressed as summer-equivalent since the 
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equivalent of winter emissions is actual winter emissions multiplied by 5/7. These graphs show 
summary statistics describing total emissions, not regression results. Summer defined as May-
September, winter as January-April and October-December. NBP participating states include: 
Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. States 
not participating in NBP include: Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, 
Kansas, Lousiana, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wyoming. 
Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, Vermont, and 
Wisconsin are excluded from the main analysis sample.  
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Appendix Figure 3. NBP Market Impact on Ambient Ozone Pollution, Detail  
 
(A) Number of Summer Days in 6 Ozone Bins, NBP Participating States, 2001-2002 
 
 

















































(C) Event Study for Daily Ozone 8-Hour Values, 1997-2007  
 
Notes: Ozone 8-hour value is measured as the maximum rolling 8-hour mean of hourly values within in 
each day, which is the statistic used in EPA nonattainment designations. Panel A shows the average 
number of summer days (out of a possible 153 days) in 6 bins for daily ozone 8-hour value in the NBP 
states in 2001-2002 (pre-NBP period). Panel B shows the estimated impact of NBP on the number of 
summer days in 4 of these categories for daily ozone 8-hour value. Panel C shows the coefficients from 
an event study regression for ozone 8-hour values where the estimates for year 2002 are restricted to have 
a value of 0. All regressions include detailed weather controls and a full set of county*year, season*year, 
and county*season fixed effects, and are weighted by the number of ozone monitors in each county. The 
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Appendix Figure 4. Event Study Graphs for All Outcomes 
 
(A) Beginning in Year 2001 
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Notes: Appendix Figure 4 reports the coefficients from event study regressions for all outcomes 
where the estimates for year 2002 are restricted to have a value of 0. All regressions include 
detailed weather controls and a full set of county*year, season*year, and county*season fixed 
effects, and are weighted by the relavant variable for a specific outcome (number of ozone 
monitors in each county, population in each county). The standard errors underlying the 95% 
confidence intervals (dashed lines) are clustered at the state-season level. See Appendix Figure 1 
notes or text for NBP participation status designation. The standard errors underlying the 95% 
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Appendix Table 1. Sensitivity Analysis: Emitted and Ambient Pollution 
 
Notes: The entries in Appendix Table 1 are the coefficient estimates on the Summer*Post*NBP variable 
from separate DDD regressions (unless noted otherwise). The reported standard errors are clustered at the 
state-season level (unless noted otherwise). The regressions use the specification and sample of Table 2 
column (4) (unless otherwise noted). The entries after row 1 present different levels of clustering for 
standard errors. Row 3 takes eight non-NBP states that border the NBP area (Iowa, Georgia, Maine, 
Missouri, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Wisconsin) and assigns them to the NBP area. Row 
4 limits non-NBP states to the half with ozone data which have the smallest Euclidean distance from NBP 
states, defined from year 2002 mean ozone, NOx emissions per square mile, medication costs per capita, 
and temperature. The non-NBP comparison states selected by this criterion are: Arkansas, California, 
Colorado, Kansas, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. "Monitors Operating ≥ 30 weeks" uses a 
monitor selection rule which requires each monitor to have valid readings in 30 weeks of each year in the 
data, rather than the 47-week rule used in the main results. "Summer*Post*NBP*VOC-Constrained" 
reports the interaction of the main triple-difference term with an MSA indicator for being VOC 
constrained based on Blanchard (2001). "Summer*Post*NBP*(High Weekend O3)” interacts the main 
triple-difference term with an indicator for whether the weekend/weekday ozone ratio of a county exceeds 
NOx SO2 CO2 Ozone Ozone Days CO PM2.5 PM10 SO2 NO2
≥65ppm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1. Baseline Sample -0.33*** -0.07** -12.43* -3.06*** -8.95*** -0.02 -0.31 -1.18 0.13 -0.92**
  State-Season Clusters (0.07) (0.03) (6.59) (0.50) (2.61) (0.02) (0.31) (0.87) (0.18) (0.35)
  County Clusters (0.08) (0.05) (7.76) (0.52) (2.44) (0.03) (0.31) (1.16) (0.24) (0.46)
  State Clusters (0.10) (0.04) (9.38) (0.70) (3.68) (0.03) (0.43) (1.24) (0.25) (0.49)
  State-Year Clusters (0.05) (0.04) (6.63) (1.13) (3.62) (0.03) (0.48) (1.44) (0.18) (0.38)
  County-Season Clusters (0.05) (0.04) (5.49) (0.37) (1.74) (0.02) (0.22) (0.83) (0.17) (0.33)
  Firm-County Clusters (0.07) (0.05) (7.96) (0.53) (2.33) (0.03) (0.29) (1.17) (0.23) (0.42)
-0.22** -0.25 -61.55 -3.06*** -8.95*** -0.01 -0.29 -3.43 0.16 -0.98*
(0.10) (0.21) (43.28) (0.50) (2.61) (0.03) (0.38) (4.56) (0.24) (0.55)
-0.25*** -0.05 -10.34* -3.03*** -8.90*** -0.02 -0.34 -0.40 0.11 -0.77**
(0.06) (0.03) (5.83) (0.49) (2.56) (0.02) (0.29) (0.93) (0.18) (0.36)
4. Limit to Most Comparable -0.32*** -0.04 -6.55 -2.97*** -9.91*** -0.03 -0.45 -1.73 0.14 -1.08***
     Non-NBP States (0.06) (0.03) (7.27) (0.53) (2.89) (0.02) (0.31) (1.23) (0.24) (0.34)
5. Post = 1.0 in Year 2003 -0.32*** -0.09*** -16.00** -3.65*** -10.70*** -0.02 -0.52 -1.30 0.01 -0.96**
(0.06) (0.03) (6.67) (0.65) (2.66) (0.02) (0.37) (0.93) (0.16) (0.36)
6. Post = 0.0 in Year 2003 -0.27*** -0.04 -6.56 -1.98*** -5.77*** -0.01 -0.09 -0.84 0.20 -0.71**
(0.06) (0.03) (5.35) (0.40) (2.14) (0.02) (0.24) (0.77) (0.16) (0.29)
7. Drop Year 2003 -0.35*** -0.08** -14.46** -3.86*** -12.02*** -0.02 -0.51 -0.69 0.05 -1.05***
(0.07) (0.03) (6.79) (0.61) (2.83) (0.02) (0.35) (0.90) (0.19) (0.37)
8. Diff-in-Diff for NBP States -0.32*** -0.07* -4.26 -4.72*** -11.04*** 0.04** 0.43* -1.88** 0.04 -1.23**
(0.06) (0.04) (3.87) (0.43) (1.99) (0.02) (0.24) (0.87) (0.12) (0.50)
9. Monitors Operating --- --- --- -3.04*** -11.72*** -0.02 -0.46 -0.43 0.11 -0.62
     ≥ 30 Weeks --- --- --- (0.42) (1.89) (0.02) (0.29) (0.97) (0.17) (0.37)
10. Main Effect --- --- --- -2.85** -12.21** --- --- --- --- ---
--- --- --- (1.22) (4.27) --- --- --- --- ---
--- --- --- 0.19 1.44 --- --- --- --- ---
--- --- --- (1.25) (4.80) --- --- --- --- ---
11. Main Effect --- --- --- -3.52*** -11.60*** --- --- --- --- ---
--- --- --- (0.57) (2.83) --- --- --- --- ---
--- --- --- 1.29** 7.21*** --- --- --- --- ---
--- --- --- (0.51) (2.29) --- --- --- --- ---
       Summer*Post*NBP *VOC-
Constrained
    Summer*Post*NBP*              
(High Weekend O3)
Emitted Pollution Air Quality (Ambient Pollution)
2. Counties With Ozone 
Monitors




1.05. This provides an alternative indicator of VOC-constrained regions. Regressions use 2001-2007 data. 









Non-Respiratory  and 
Non-Cardiovascular
(1) (2) (3)
1. Baseline Sample -0.015** -0.021*** -0.014**
  State-Season Clusters (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
  County Clusters (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
  State Clusters (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
  State-Year Clusters (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
  County-Season Clusters (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
  Firm-County Clusters (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
2. Non-NBP Border States Assigned to -0.016*** -0.021*** -0.015***
    NBP (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
3. Limit to Most Comparable Non-NBP -0.014* -0.016* -0.013
    States (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
4. Post = 1.0 in Year 2003 -0.010 -0.015* -0.008
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
5. Post = 0.0 in Year 2003 -0.016*** -0.021*** -0.016***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
6. Drop Year 2003 -0.012* -0.019** -0.011*
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
7. Log Medications (Not Costs) -0.014** -0.020** -0.012**
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
8. Ages 0-17 0.005 0.001 0.004
(0.013) (0.020) (0.013)
9. Panel of People -0.009 -0.018** -0.005
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
10. Levels (Not Logs) -10.640*** -2.991*** -8.149***
(2.445) (0.950) (2.187)
11. Purchase-Specific Costs -0.013** -0.020*** -0.011*
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006)




Appendix Table 2. Sensitivity Analysis: Medications (ctd) 
 
Notes: The entries in Appendix Table 2 are the coefficient estimates on the Summer*Post*NBP variable 
from separate DDD regressions using data for 2001-2007. The reported standard errors are clustered at 
the state-season level. Row 2 takes eight non-NBP states that border the NBP area (Iowa, Georgia, Maine, 
Missouri, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Wisconsin) and assigns them to the NBP area. Row 
3 limits non-NBP states to the half with ozone data which have the smallest Euclidean distance from NBP 
states, defined from year 2002 mean ozone, NOx emissions per square mile, medication costs per capita, 
and temperature. The non-NBP comparison states selected by this criterion are: Arkansas, California, 
Colorado, Kansas, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. “Log Medications (not costs)” uses 
counts of medication purchases, rather than cost measures. "Panel of People" uses the much smaller panel 
of persons who appear in all observations of the MarketScan sample. "Levels (Not Logs)" specifies the 
response variable in levels rather than logs. "Purchase-Specific Costs" uses the raw reported prices, rather 
than averaging across national drug codes to deal with outliers as in the main analysis. "Counties with 
Ozone Data" restricts the analysis to include only counties with ozone monitors satisfying the monitor 
selection rule. "Copay" measures costs as purchase-level patient expenditures. Asterisks denote p-value < 





Non-Respiratory  and 
Non-Cardiovascular
(1) (2) (3)
13. 2000-2007 Firm Panel -0.009 -0.017** -0.008
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
14. Mail Order -0.015** -0.009 -0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
15. Only Counties with Ozone Monitors -0.016*** -0.017* -0.017**
(0.006) (0.010) (0.008)
16. Respiratory: Short-Acting Only --- -0.025 ---
--- (0.018) ---




Appendix Table 3. Sensitivity Analysis: Hospitalization Costs  
 
Notes: The entries in Appendix Table 3 are the coefficient estimates on the Summer*Post*NBP variable 
from separate DDD regressions using data for 2001-2007. The reported standard errors are clustered at 
the state-season level. Asterisks denote p-value < 0.10 (*), <0.05 (**), <0.01 (***). 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A: All Hospitalizations
1. All Hospitalizations -5.91 -4.17 -7.43 -79.12***
(19.60) (22.34) (23.12) (28.01)
B: Specific Groups of Hospitalizations
2. Respiratory or Cardiovascular -9.26 -9.13 -10.22 -44.95***
(5.59) (6.77) (6.69) (13.30)
3. Non-Respiratory and Non-Cardiovascular 3.36 4.96 2.79 -34.17
(15.98) (17.17) (18.90) (20.44)
County-by-Season FE x x x x
Summer-by-Year FE x x x x
State-by-Year FE x x
County-by-Year FE x x
Detailed Weather Controls x x x
Only Counties With Ozone Monitors x
Weighted by Population x x x x
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Appendix Table 4. Sensitivity Analysis: Mortality  
 
Notes: The entries in Appendix Table 4 are the coefficient estimates on the Summer*Post*NBP variable 
from separate DDD regressions using data for 1997-2007. The reported standard errors are clustered at 
the state-season level. Row 2 takes eight non-NBP states that border the NBP area (Iowa, Georgia, Maine, 
Missouri, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Wisconsin) and assigns them to the NBP area. Row 
3 limits non-NBP states to the half with ozone data which have the smallest Euclidean distance from NBP 
states, defined from year 2002 mean ozone, NOx emissions per square mile, medication costs per capita, 
and temperature. The non-NBP comparison states selected by this criterion are: Arkansas, California, 
Colorado, Kansas, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. "Logs (Not Levels)" specifies the 
response variable in logs rather than levels. Age-adjustment modifies the response variable to use age-
adjusted mortality counts, rather than total deaths per population. Regressions use 1997-2007 data. 








1. Baseline Sample -1.47* -0.47 -1.00**
  State-Season Clusters (0.81) (0.67) (0.50)
  County Clusters (1.19) (0.79) (0.78)
  State Clusters (1.16) (0.96) (0.71)
  State-Year Clusters (1.70) (1.13) (0.88)
  County-Season Clusters (0.84) (0.56) (0.55)
2. Non-NBP Border States Assigned to NBP -0.73 -0.25 -0.48
(0.83) (0.65) (0.50)
3. Limit to Most Comparable Non-NBP -0.34 -0.06 -0.28
    States (0.83) (0.72) (0.47)
4. Post = 1.0 in Year 2003 -0.93 0.13 -1.06**
(0.79) (0.65) (0.49)
5. Post = 0.0 in Year 2003 -1.78** -1.00 -0.78*
(0.79) (0.63) (0.46)
6. Drop Year 2003 -1.64* -0.61 -1.02*
(0.84) (0.67) (0.53)
7. Logs (Not Levels) -0.01** -0.01** 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
8. Age-Adjustment -1.45 -0.71 -0.74
(0.89) (0.69) (0.54)




Appendix Table 5. Heterogeneity Within NBP Region in NBP Effects  
 
Notes: The entries in Appendix Table 4 are the coefficient estimates on Summer*Post*NBP*X, where X 
is the interaction term specified in each row of the table. The reported standard errors are clustered at the 
state-season level. The regression also controls for Summer*Post*NBP (coefficient not shown), for 
detailed weather controls, and for county-by-season, county-by-year, and season-by-year fixed effects.  
Row 1 interacts the main effect with an indicator for being in one of the ten Northeastern states where 
NBP began in 2003 rather than 2004. Row 3 interacts the main effect with a dummy for a summer having 





Interaction of NBP*Post*Summer with Dummy for …
     1. Ten Northeastern States -2.648*** -0.038*** -1.118
(0.794) (0.014) (2.273)
    2. County has Below-Median -0.364 0.015 4.793
        Weekend/Weekday Ozone Ratio (0.904) (0.009) (4.373)
        in Summer 2002 (VOC-Constrained)
     3. County has Above-Median 2.630** -0.005 -0.655
         Post-2003 Mean Summer (1.135) (0.006) (1.633)
         Temperature
     4. State has Above-Median -1.104 0.029*** 2.765
         Child Asthma Rate (1.067) (0.010) (3.334)
     5. State has Above-Median -1.109 -0.013 -0.474
         Adult+Child Asthma Rate (1.167) (0.012) (3.274)
     6. County's has Above-Median -0.975 -0.006 -1.601
        2002 Medication Expenditure (0.792) (0.009) (4.445)
        or Mortality Per Capita
     7. County has Above-Median --- -0.043 -1.120
         2002 Respir.+Cardio. Medication --- (0.043) (3.361)
         Expenditure or Mortality per Capita
     8. County has Above-Median -3.098*** -0.004 -7.047*
         Number of Ozone Days ≥60ppb (0.488) (0.012) (4.078)
         in Summer 2002
County-by-Season FE x x x
Summer-by-Year FE x x x
County-by-Year FE x x x
Detailed Weather Controls x x x
Data Begin in 2001 x x x
Weighted by Population x x x
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county. Rows 4 and 5 interact the main effect with dummies for a state having above-median 2002 asthma 
rates. Rows 6 and 7 interact the main effect with a dummy for a county having above-median summer 
2002 medication expenditures or mortality. All data include years 2001-2007. Asterisks denote p-value < 





Appendix Table 6. Characteristics of the MarketScan Sample  
 
Notes: Column (1) describes the main 2001-2007 sample. Current Population Survey (CPS) data 
restricted to individuals with strictly positive working hours. 
 
MarketScan CPS Jan 2003 Census 2000
(1) (2) (3)
Employee Classification
     Union 0.24 0.13 ---
     Non-Union 0.76 0.87 ---
     Salary 0.60 0.53 ---
     Hourly 0.40 0.47 ---
Employment Status
     Active Full-Time Employee 0.97 0.82 0.42
     Active Part-Time Employee 0.03 0.18 0.11
Relation of Patient to Employee
     Employee 0.44 --- ---
     Spouse 0.23 --- ---
     Child/Other 0.33 --- ---
Industry
     Oil & Gas Extraction, Mining 0.01 0.00 0.00
     Manufacturing, Durable Goods 0.27 0.09 0.05
     Manufacturing, Nondurable Goods 0.19 0.04 0.03
     Transportation, Communications, Utilities 0.33 0.08 0.05
     Retail Trade 0.02 0.12 0.07
     Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 0.04 0.07 0.04
     Services 0.14 0.44 0.28
Sex
     Male 0.48 0.52 0.49
     Female 0.52 0.48 0.51
Age
     0-4 Years 0.06 0.00 0.07
     5-17 Years 0.20 0.02 0.19
     18-64 Years 0.75 0.95 0.62
     ≥65 Years 0.00 0.03 1.00
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Appendix Table 7. Effect of NOx Emissions and Ambient Ozone Concentrations On 
Medication Purchases and Mortality: Instrumental Variables Estimates, 2001-2007, by 
Cause 
 



















  (1) (2a) (2b)   (3) (4a) (4b) 
A: 2SLS, Respiratory or Cardiovascular 
     NOx Emissions 29.41 16.33* --- 
 
1.94 1.98 --- 
 
(18.27) (8.36) --- 
 
(2.36) (1.48) --- 
        8-Hour Ozone --- --- 6.68* 
 
--- --- 1.18 
 
--- --- (3.58) 
 
--- --- (0.86) 
        Days ≥65 ppb --- --- 1.81* 
 
--- --- 0.39 
 
--- --- (1.06) 
 
--- --- (0.31) 
        B: 2SLS, Non-Respiratory and Non-Cardiovascular 
    NOx Emissions 19.90 11.57** --- 
 
3.22 3.37* --- 
 
(13.43) (5.60) --- 
 
(2.24) (1.81) --- 
        8-Hour Ozone --- --- 6.64** 
 
--- --- 1.45*** 
 
--- --- (2.93) 
 
--- --- (0.53) 
        Days ≥65 ppb --- --- 1.80** 
 
--- --- 0.48** 
  --- --- (0.86)   --- --- (0.21) 
Notes: In Panel A, the dependent variable includes respiratory or cardiovascular medication 
costs or mortality; in Panel B, the dependent variable includes all non-respiratory and non-
cardiovascular medication costs or mortality. The coefficient estimates in columns (1), (2a), and 
(2b) are multiplied by 1000 for readability. All estimates are based on the 2001-2007 sample. NOx 
emissions are measured in thousand tons per county. All regressions include county*year, 
season*year, and county*season fixed effects, as well as the detailed weather controls. The 
regressions are GLS weighted by the square root of the relevant population in a given county-year-
season (MarketScan or full population). The endogenous variable is NOx or ozone and the excluded 
instrument is Summer*Post*NBP interaction (see equation 9). Number of observations is 30,926 for 
medication regressions including all counties, 7,616 for medication regressions including counties 
with NOx emissions, 2,338 for medication regressions including only counties with ozone monitors, 
35,546 for mortality regressions including all counties, 7,840 for mortality regressions including 
counties with NOx emissions, and 2,352 for mortality regressions only including counties with 
ozone monitors. The sample is smaller for medications than for mortality due to counties without no 
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